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ABSTRACT
Symbolic Interactionists maintain that a process of
definition is inherent in all human interaction.

This

process is assumed, by Herbert Blumer and others, to be
an indeterminate process.

Some symbolic interactionists

have argued that, because of this indeterminism, a dif
ferent methodology from that used in the natural sciences
is required for the analysis of human actions: others have
suggested that symbolic interactionism cannot be a science.
This analysis has the following objectives:
1.

The delineation of the major elements of Blumer’s
symbolic interactionism.

2.

The analysis of the relationship between language,
objects and distinctions.

3.

The delineation of the major characteristics of
covering-law explanations and the compatibility
of these characteristics with the major elements
of symbolic interactionism.
It will be shown, in the first chapter, that Blumer

emphasizes the process of self-indication and that he does
not differentiate between language and objects.

It will

also be shown that two presuppositions pervade Blumer’s
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approach: l) that man Is capable of originative mental
synthesis; and 2) that human social life is characterized
by a subjective factor.
Blumer argues that, even when a ’situation* has a
prescribed

’meaning’, the process of self-indication en

ables an actor to reject, accept, or modify the prescribed
’meaning’.

As a result of his emphasis upon the process

of self-indication, Blumer gives little attention to the
symbolic-nonsymbolic dichotomy, and none to the languageobject dichotomy.

To him, both language and objects are

human constructs, as are moral principles.

Blumer denies

that symbolic interactionism cannot be a science and pro
poses two ’modes of inquiry’: Exploration and Inspection.
However, he asserts that complete descriptions may elimi
nate the need for theoretical schemes, and it is therefore
suggested that he is ambivalent concerning the utility of
theoretical explanations.

It is also argued that he is

equally ambivalent concerning the ’objectivity’ of histo
rical knowledge.
The second chapter explicates the process of making
a distinction and analyzes its relationship to language
and objects.
delineated.

Two usages of the term ’distinction’ are
Blumer, it is shown, argues that the actor

/
ii
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can make private distinctions and, since Wittgenstein has
argued against this, an attempt is made to evaluate Wit
tgenstein's argument.

The analysis indicates that the

process of making a distinction is a form of rule-foilowing
behavior.
The nature of language is examined in order to ex
plicate the characteristics of rule-following actions and
%

to ascertain the utility of the symbolic-nonsymbolic
dichotomy.

It is argued that logical principles are not

derived from language, but are apriori.

From this it is

inferred that animals may use, or appear to use, some
logical principles;
distinctions.

and it is argued that animals do make

This, it is suggested, means that the

symbolic-nonsymbolic dichotomy is of little significance
in the study of human social behavior: everything is symbolic,
The apriori nature of logical principles also indicates that
the same logical principles can be observed in all societies.
The relationship between the Emic-Etic concepts and
the two types of distinctions is briefly examined and a
number of similarities are suggested.
The relationship between language and objects is ex
amined and Blumer’s non-differentiation of these two con
cepts is shown to be congruent with the analyses of Quine

iii
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and Wegner: words and objects are severally meaningless and
only become significant when related to the total knowledge
of the group.

Quine's analysis shows that there is a

'systematic indeterminacy' concerning the empirical re
ferents of all statements and it is argued that this places
severe restrictions upon all ethnographic studies; the
statements in any language are open to more than one inter
pretation.
The process of making a distinction is seen to involve
the attachment of value to a distinction and it is argued
that Blumer's assertion that moral principles are human
constructs is congruent with the 'non-cognitive' metaethical approach to ethics.

This approach is seen to pre

sent serious limitations upon the objectivity of histor
ical knowledge.
The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the
conscious-unconscious aspects of rule-following behavior.
It is suggested that it is not essential that the actual
decisions of the actor be conscious, providing that the
actor has the ability to easily become aware of them.
The third chapter discusses the major character
istics of covering-law explanations and the compatibility
of the major elements of symbolic interactionism to these

iv
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characteristics.

It is acknowledged that there is a

continuing controversy among philosophers of science
$

as to the nature of scientific explanation.

Hempel's

covering-law model is assumed, for the purpose of this
thesis, to be the most respected current theory of
scientific explanations.

It is noted that Hempel was

striving to create a nonpragmatic model of scientific
explanation as had been developed in mathematics.

Brief

reference is made to Popper's important distinction between
laws and trends, and to Ayer's distinction between 'gen
eralizations of fact' and 'generalizations of law'.
Watanabe's Ugly Duckling Theorem is presented and it
is argued that his proof of the nonlogical nature of clas
sification severely limits Hempel's model.

It is also

argued that Watanabe's theorem precludes the development
of covering-law explanations which Involve Emic descriptions.
It is suggested that this conclusion is congruent with
Peter Winch's assertion that a nomothetic science of human
behavior is impossible.

Winch's arguments have received

many criticisms and some of these are examined in order to
ascertain the validity of his assertion.

The criticisms

examined did not refute Winch's assertion insofar as it
concerned rule-governed behavior.
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The game of chess is used to illustrate some of the
problems of developing covering-law explanations for rulefollowing behavior.

Some of the problems of validation

are also delineated.

The extent to which social behavior

is rule-governed is illustrated with an excerpt from M.
Tumin.
The fourth chapter discusses briefly the various ap
proaches that social scientists can use to analyze rulegoverned behavior:

covering-law models having been excluded.

It is suggested that the primary task of social scientists
is the delineation of behavior which is characterized as
rule-following from that which is not.

It is also suggested

that the analysis of rule-governed behavior requires the use
and knowledge of the various types of logic: symbolic, deontic and modal logic.

vi
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PREFACE
Basic Orientation
The study of social phenomena has been approached
in various ways(lN)*.

Symbolic Interactionism refers to

the approach that emphasizes that social behavior is built
out of the joint actions of the actors(2N).

Interactionism,

a term covering a number of separate ways of studying social
phenomena, has been sub-divided into nine schools: one of
which is termed the Blumer school(3).

This school focuses

upon the more subjective aspects of social behavior and
bases its approach upon the philosophical analyses of George
Herbert Mead.

It asserts that the appropriate methodology

is the ’direct study’ of social actions,

e.g. participant

observation(4 ).* It maintains that a process of definition
is inherent in all human interaction, and this process is
seen as an indeterminate process in which the ’meaning’ of
an ’event’ is not to be considered as intrinsic to the ’event’,
but is attached to the ’event’ by the actor or actors(SN).

All reference numbers that have an N appended
indicate that there is an elaboration at the end of the
chapter.
If there is no N, the number refers only to a
citation.

ix
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statement of the Problem
The emphasis that Blumer places upon the indeter
minacy of the process of definition has led to the charge
that symbolic interactionism cannot be'a science.

Blumer

has denied this charge, but his attitude toward theoretical
explanations is ambivalent: he suggests that complete des
criptions of a state of affairs may obviate the need for
analytical explanations.

His ambivalence may be a result

of the argument, proposed by other scholars, that a nomo
thetic science of social behavior is impossible(6N).
The problem to be analyzed is whether the nature of
symbolic interactionism, as delineated by Blumer, precludes
theoretical explanations of a nomothetical form, thereby
limiting the utility of nomothetic methodologies.
Objectives
1.

The delineation of the major elements of Blumer’s
symbolic interactionism.

2.

The analysis of the relationship between language, ob
jects and distinctions.

3.

The delineation of the major characteristics of coveringlaw explanations and the compatibility of these charac
teristics with the major elements of symbolic inter
actionism.
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NOTES: PREFACE

1.

Alan Dawe suggests that all sociological research
can be divided into two approaches: the Social
System perspective and the Social Action perspec
tive.
(Dawe, 1970:207-218).

2.

Warshay, 1971:29.

3.

Warshay, 1971:29.

4.

Warshay, 1971:29.

5.

Not all interactionists share this belief in the
indeterminacy of the process of definition.
See
Manford H. Kuhn, 1970:49-59).

6.

While the issue concerning determinism and free will
cannot be discussed in this thesis, Ernest Nagel
has suggested that determinism is desirable for
scientific inquiry:
...determinism can be regarded as a
fruitful maxim or regulative principle
for inquiry... if it is abandoned, then
inquiry in certain directions is, at
least temporarily, brought to a halt.
(Nagel, 1968:199).

See also chapter I of this thesis.

xi
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CHAPTER I

BLUMER: SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

The term symbolic interactionism was introduced by
Herbert Blumer in 1937(l), and refers to a particular
approach to the study of human life(2).

The principles

underlying this approach have been traced to G. Simmel
and M. Weber in Germany(3),

and to George Herbert Nead,

John Dewey, W.I. Thomas, William James, Charles Norton
Cooley, Florian Znaniecki, Robert E. Park, James.Mark
Baldwin, Robert Redfield and Louis Wirth in America(4N).
It has also been related to the writings of John Locke,
David Hume and G. Tarde(5).

To the extent that symbolic

interactionism analyzes the nature of man and society,
its origins can be traced back to the earliest philosophers(6N).

The analyses of the philosophers were often

more speculative than empirical(7N).
There appears to be some disagreement among socio
logists concerning the nature and scope of symbolic inter
actionism,

Swanson, in the International Encyclopedia of

the Social Sciences, states that it "...refers to the
process by which individuals relate to their own minds or
the minds of others."(8).

However, Blumer broadens its
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scope to include m a n ’s interaction with all ’objects’,
concrete or abstract, human or animal, animate or inanimate(9).

Arnold Rose suggests that there are two

kinds of environments:

social and physical(10).

Rose

also delineates two strains of symbolic interaction
theory: one is concerned with the study of the socializa
tion of the child, the other studies social processes and
social organizations(U N ),
I have chosen to present Blumer’s variation of
symbolic interactionism because: l) he coined the term;
2) he is considered one of the foremost exponents of this
approach(l2N); and 3) he is highly respected within
sociology(13N).

There are other contemporary sociolo

gists who have proposed similar schemes and some of these
will be referred to in this paper(l4N).
Symbolic interactionism has been described as more
of an orientation than a systematic theory(l5).

As an

orientation it manifests several ambiguities(16N),

This

presentation of the principles of symbolic interaction
will include some of Blumer’s criticisms of other socio
logical approaches to the study of man and society.

His.

criticisms,se^en as definitions by negation, will allow a
clearer delineation of his approach(17N).
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This presentation of Blumer’s approach will attempt
to show the pervasive influence of two presuppositions.
These are: i) that^man is capable of "originative mental
synthesis"(18N) and 2) that human social life is uniquely
characterized by a subjective factor(l9N).
Blumer bases his theory on M e a d ’s analysis of human
group life(20N), and in Blumer’s opinion, the "key feature
in M e a d ’s analysis is that the human being has a self"(21),
He observes that there is nothing esoteric about the self
(22N), and states that Mead postulated the "self" in order
to allow the actor to be "the object of his own actions"
(23).

The ability to act towards himself is the "central

mechanism" with which the actor deals with the world(24).
It allows the actor to make indications to himself of the
things in'his surroundings(25).

This process of indicating

to himself is the equivalent of consciousness(26), and this
ability emerges, along with the mind and the world of "ob
jects", from human group lif e(27).

Anything which the

actor is conscious of is something which he is indicating
to himself.

If he is not indicating it to himself, he is

not conscious of it(28).

This emphasis- upon consciousness

leaves Blumer open to the criticism that he ignores the
"unconscious" part of the self(29N).

Blumer does admit
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that there are rare cases in which there is no self
indication,

such as "the mood of melancholy, the craving

of a drug addict for narcotics,
in a panic".

a burning rage and fright

However, he claims that these states are

not characteristic of social interaction:
(These) instances are not the pro
totype of human social interaction...
(because) they stand in opposition to
group life.
If everyone expressed
freely his felt tendencies and at
titudes, social life would become a
state of anarchy(30N).
Blumer states that the self is
ego.

not the same as the

The ego would only be a self if it

was

reflexive.

Neither can the self be considered as some kind of organ
ization of attitudes:

"The reflexive process... alone can

yield and constitute a self"(31N).

The possession of a

reflexive self allows the actor to interpret and organize
the world:
...he acts toward his world, in
terpreting what confronts
him and
organizing his actions on
the basis
of the interpretation(32).

The process of interpretation is also a process of
definition(33N), and this dual process involves attaching
meaning to something: that is, making it into an object
(34 , see also 4 0 N ) .
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...objects are human constructs and
not self-existing entities with in
trinsic natures(35N).
Blumer emphasizes that anything can be an "object",
including ghosts, abstract moral principles, a mother, a
priest, students,

etc.(36N).

B lum er ’s use of the terms

’meaning’ and ’object’ is

such that it is not possible to use one without implying
the other; they seem to be synonyms:
...the environment consists only of
the objects that the given human
beings recognize and know. The
nature of this environment is set
by the meaning that the objects
composing it have for those human
beings(37).
The meanings are formed both by the process of social
interaction(38) and by the individual actor(39), and be
cause the actor may redefine the ’object’ or situation,
there is an inherent uncertainly concerning the ’meanings’
or situations(40N).

This indeterminacy can be seen to be

the result of the "reflexive" property of the self; the
"originative mental synthesis" of the actor.
The term
in addition to

"meaning" can also have an expressive sense,
its referential sense. It would appear

that

when Blumer states that the actor "attaches meaning", he is
referring to both the expressive and referential aspects
of’m e e ni n g’.

If this is the case, the criticism that
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Mead (and thereby Blumer) ignored the role of affective
elements in social interaction is un w a r r a n t e d (41).

The

actor can, and apparently must, evaluate (appraise, judge,
assess) the ’objecf’ each time he indicates it to himself
(42N).

This process of evaluation would seem to determine

both the significance and the sentiments that are "attached"
to the ’object *(43N).

He does state that attitudes,

as

expressed in action, are a consequence of the process of
definition, in which he perceives:
The vital dependency of the at
titude on the nature of the on
going interaction ...(44N).
' Blumer's emphasis upon the primacy of the process of
self-interaction(45N) makes him
that use

very critical

structural or cultural factors,

such

of

theories

as

values,

norms, roles, status demands, rules, reference group af
filiation, institutional pressures or social system re
quirements, as determinants of social action(46).

These

factors may act as ’limits’(47) or frameworks within which
social action takes place(48) but even stable and repeti
tive forms of social action do not occur automatically;
the processes of self indication and social interaction
are always present:
What takes place in these two pro
cesses largely determines the sta
tus and fate of norms or rules;...
(49N).
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While he acknowledges that there are cases of
"highly ritualistic" behavior, he suggests that these
are not the prototype of human group life(50),

except

possibly in isolated primitive or peasant communities
(51).

It must be noted that the process of self-indica

tion is itself a form of rule following,

and that Blumer

is therefore arguing against the determinate nature of
rules that are external to the self.
Blumer does, however, refer to the ’historical di
mensions’ of social actions, but his statements con
flict.

In one case he asserts that it is invalid to

isolate any form of social action from its ’historical
linkage’(52), while in another he observes that ways of
human living are "... seemingly products of historical
experience"(53: my emphasis).

It appears that he wants

to show some historical continuity between social actions
but is inhibited by his prior commitment to the primacy
of the process of self-indication:
It is highly important to recognize
that the established patterns of
group life just do not carry on by
themselves but are dependent for
their continuity on recurrent af
firmative definition(54).
...The career of joing actions also
must be seen as open to many possi
bilities of uncertainty... one,
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joint actions have to be initiated and they may not be.
Two, once
started, a joint action may be in
terrupted, abandoned, or trans
formed.
Thre e...(5 5 N ).
Blumer acknowledges that the

’domain’ of social

science is the study of joint actions but insists that
these joint actions must be seen as "an interlinkage of
the separate acts of the participants"(56).

Social

action is the primary subject matter and society "must
necessarily be seen in terms of the acting units that
form it", rather than in terms of units,
classes that do not act(57N).

such as social

And, for Blumer, one of

the more important ’actions’ is the process of selfindication(58N).

He suggests, as has been noted, that

the actions of the actor may be limited by societal or
ganizations, roles and historical linkages; but the de
gree of limitation is unclear(59N).
He does not distinguish the action of speaking from
other types of action because both are symbolic, i.e. ob
jects are as much human constructs as words(60N).

Blumer

discusses the distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic
interaction in only three paragraphs(61), and he provides
two examples of non-symbolic interaction: reflex responses,
excluding a boxer who identifies ("reflectively") a forth
coming blow as a feint(62); and "unwitting" responses to
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the tone of another's voice(63N).

These two examples

suggest that the distinguishing characteristic of nonsymbolic interaction is that it is unconscious, and this
seems congruent with his stress upon consciousness.

Very

few references to language occur in his writings(6 4 N ),
and I will attempt,

in the following chapters, to show

that this is a consequence of his emphasis upon the pro
cess of self-indication.
Social order is the result of "...the fitting to
gether of acts to form joint actions"(65).

This may oc

cur for many reasons, including "sheer necessity".

It

is not a case of the internalization of norms but of taking
the roles of others.

"Social control becomes fundamentally

and necessarily a matter of self-control"(66N).

The social

order, for Blumer, is characterized by continual change;
and this flux is a direct result of the actor's ability to
’reaffirm’ a current ’definition of the situation’):
Social change becomes a continuous
indigenous process in human group
life instead of an episodic result
of extraneous facts playing on es
tablished structure(67Nj.
It is perhaps this aspect of symbolic interactionism
that has led some critics to state that it cannot be a
science.

Blumer observes that this is an "astounding

charge"(68), and suggests that these critics have a
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"profound misunderstanding of both scientific inquiry and
symbolic interactionism"(69).
inquiry:

He outlines two modes of

"exploration" and "inspection".

The major re

quirement of both of these methods is "a return to the
empirical social world"(70).

Exploratory research would

give an accurate description of some area of social life
and this, Blumer states, may be enough to answer theoretical
questions,

or to eliminate the need for a theory:
...the fuller descriptive account
it (exploration) yields will fre
quently give an adequate explana
tion of what was problematic with
out the need of invoking any the
ory or proposing any analytical
scheme(71N: my brackets and em
phasis) .

Blum e r’s minimization of the value of analytical
schemes, illustrated in this quotation, will be shown in a
subsequent chapter, to be a result of his emphasis upon the
"process of self-indication".
The "inspection"mode of inquiry involves analysis to
discover "generic relationships" and "discriminating ana
lytical elements"

(i.e. concepts)(72).

This mode of inquiry,

"inspection", is proposed in one of his more recent publica
tions.

In earlier essays he has asserted that no generic

relationships have been discovered yet by sociologists
("Sociological Analysis and the ’Variable’"), and that there
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11
are no concepts with fixed denotations in sociology"(What
is wrong with Social Theory)." In the latter essay, he
suggested that "definite concepts" were not suited to the
study of social phenomena(73N).
As was noted, Blumer distinguishes between symbolic
interactionism and other theoretical approaches which also
acknowledges that human life is characterized by a sub
jective factor.

The major difference is that symbolic

interactionism attributes the source of "meaning" to both
the process of social interaction and the process of self
indication:
The meaning of a thing for a person
grows out of the ways in which other
persons act towards the person with
regard to the thing...(74)
To this extent symbolic interactionism is congruent
with other approaches,

such as that of Max Weber.

Ho w 

ever, Blumer also observes:
...it is a mistake to think that
the use of meaning by a person is
but an application of the meaning
so derived.
This mistake seriously
mars the work of many scholars who
otherwise follow the symbolic interactionist approach... the use of
meanings by the actor occurs through
a_ process of interpretation..... .
The actor selects, checks, suspends,
regroups and transforms the mean
ings... Accordingly, interpretation
should not be regarded as a mere
automatic application of established
meanings, but as a formative pro
cess ...(75 ).
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Blu m er ’s approach can be compared with the follow
ing statement by Robert A. Stebbins in an article en
titled "Studying the Definition of the Situation: Theory
and Field Research Strategies":
...For classes of actors within
an identity, what predispositions
are activated by elements in the
ongoing setting that lead to the
selection of one of these defini
tions instead of another?(76: my
emphasis).
Stebbins appears
proach:

to be using a stimulus-response ap

and implicitly denies that

process" by the actor.
as defined by Blumer.

there isany "formative

This is not symbolic interactionism
Blumer explicitly denies that the

self is a collection of ’predispositions’ or attitudes (see
note 31), and insists that there are no fixed ’elements' in
the social world that ’activate’ that self in any deter
minate manner:
The process of self-indication
by means of which human action
is formed cannot be accounted
for by factors which precede
the act(77).
This presentation of Blumer’s approach has, at times,
ignored some of his statements that appeared to conflict
with the main trend of his argument.

For example, he as

serts, at one point, that it is important that the re
searcher discover how the actors see their "key objects":
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The depiction of key objects that
emerge from such accounts should
...be subject t o . ..critical dis
cussion by a group of well-in
formed participants in the given
world.
This latter procedure is
a genuine "must" to guard against
* the admitted deficiencies of in
dividual accounts(78).
The use of the word "key" in the above statement
implies that there are such 'things’ as "key objects",
and suggests that if the researcher manages to ’depi ct’
them he will have noted something
’permanent’ about that group.

’solid',

’re a l ’ or

In itself the statement

is innocuous, but in conjunction with Blumer’s emphasis
upon the process of self-indication it is incongruous.
For instance, he has stated:
...to presume that a knowledge of an
attitude toward an object in one sit
uation foretells action toward that
object in a different kind of situat
ion is to seriously misunderstand and
misrepresent the nature of human actions(79).
In other words, key objects are only key objects relative
to particular situations.

Elsewhere he asserts:

Objects have no fixed status except
as their meaning is sustained...
nothing is more apparent than that
objects in all categories can under
go change in their meaning ... human
group life is a process in which ob
jects are being created, affirmed,
transformed, and cast aside(80: my
emphasis).
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The major problem, then, is not the description of
the "key objects" of a group at any one time, although
this does present difficulties, but the theoretical
status of these "key objects".: objects which can be
"cast aside" at any time, and which will be "cast aside"
at some time.

The problem is to develop a theoretical

scheme which will explain which "key. objects" will be
cast aside, when this will occur, the order in which it
will occur, and which other objects will become "key ob
jects".

The answer to this problem hinges upon the re

lationship between objects and the process of self
indication.
The process of self-indication is a process in which
the actor indicates something to himself, and all humans
have this ability to make indications to themselves.

The

major point of his argument is that the actors cannot not
indicate to themselves: there is a "meaningless infinity
of the world process" and the act of ’perceiving’ one
’thing’ in this "infinity" is an act of self-indication.
As long as we speak of an actor ’acting’, rather than of
chaotic or purposeless movements, we must acknowledge that
the process of self-indication is continuously operating,
and that the actions can only be classed as ’actions’ when
there is some order or value perceived in them.
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The ability to indicate to oneself can also be
described as the ability to make distinctions: to in
dicate something to oneself is to distinguish one ’t h in g’
from the ’infinity’ of things.

It must, however, be re

cognized that there are no ’thin gs ’ ’out th er e’.
example, there are no ’th in g s ’ like

For

’t re e s ’ ’out-there’:

the actor creates the ’tree' and creates the ’edges’ or
’boundaries’ of the ’t r e e ’ which separate the ’tr e e ’ from
the "meaningless infinity of the world process".

It is

because that ’t r e e ’ is a creation of the actor that it
h a s ’meaning’: the actor chose to create ’i t ’ rather than
something else, or nothing, and by his action he has af
firmed that ’it ’ has significance.

The action of indi

cating must involve the exclusion of the majority of the
’meaningless infinity of the world process'.

To make a

distinction is to distinguish something and it is a log
ical contradiction to assert that what is distinguished
is of thefsame order of significancejas that from which
it is distinguished.

"Man exists in action". Blumer af

firms, and an action is not purposeless, it is an ex
pression of the assessment of the situation made by the
process of self-indication:

actions are the result of the

process of self-indication,

and are therefore expressions

of an evaluation.
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Blumer, in differentiating his approach from other
approaches that also emphasize the existence of a sub
jective factor in social behavior, denies that language
determines the way in which actors see objects.

He argues

forcibly that the 'meaning' that is attached to any object
or situation is not determined by any pre-existing factors:
and such factors would include language.

It is generally

believed that there is some kind of determinate,

or fixed,

relationship between an object and a word; this is a re 
lationship that is clearly indicated in most discussions
of "ostensive definitions".

Blumer's argument obviously

modifies this relationship, and the following chapter will
attempt to further explicate the process of self-indication,
and to corroborate Blumer's argument concerning the relation
ship between language and objects, by presenting some con
gruent arguments of other scholars.
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NOTES:

C h a p te r I

1.

Blumer,

1969b:lN.

2.

Blumer, 1969b:l.

3.

Rose, 1962:3.

4.

Blumer: 1969b:l.
Don Martindale adds
Ernst Cassirer,
Jean Piaget, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills to the list
of contributors. (Martindale: The Nature and Types of
Sociological Theory, pp 339-375}.

5.

Manis and Meltzer, 1970:V, 46.

6 . Cooley, one of the major proponents of this approach
titled one of his books: Human Nature and the Social
Orde r.
7.

M e a d ’s writings have been characterized this way.
Manis and Meltzer, 1970:5,6,22, and Blumer:61.

8 . Swanson:
9.

See

(I.E.S.S.) 441, Vol.5.

Blumer, 1969b:10.

10.

Rose, 1962:5.

11.

Rose, 1962:8.
Leon H. Warshay distinguishes 9 varieties
of "interactionism", the first being "the Blumer school",
(Warshay:1971:29).

12.

Manis and Meltzer, 1971:vi.
Devereux has suggested that
in analyzing a theory the substance of the theory is
more relevant than its origins:
For it seems to me that when one is
discussing a scientific theory, it
is its substance rather than its or
igins that ought to be the main fo
cus of attention.
(Devereux Jr.,
1964:4).

13.

In 1939 he was invited by the Social Science Research
Council to write the first of a series of works en
titled "Critiques of Research in the Social Sciences".
He was editor of "The American Journal of Sociology?
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- from 1941-1952.
He was president of the "Society
for the Study of Social Problems" in 1954.
In 1955
he was president of the American Sociological As 
sociation, and from 1962-1966 he was vice-president
of the International Sociological Association.
14. Sociologists such as Mclver, Bolton, Becker and Kuhn,
Manford H. Kuhn states that the last twenty-five years
has seen the development of numerous sub-theories "go
ing by a variety of names other than symbolic inter
actionism".
He mentions the following sub-theories:
role theory, reference group theory, social percep
tion theories, self theory, dramatergical theories,
interpersonal theory of H.S. Sullivan, and the Lan
guage and culture orientation of Sapir-Whorf-Cassirer.
(Manfred H. Kuhn:1970:48-59) Kuhn classifies some of
these sub-theories as 'determinate’, and Blumer may
be referring to these when he observed that it is a
mistake to assume that "... the use of meaning by a
person is but an application of the meaning so de
rived (from social interaction).
This mistake
seriously mars the work of many scholars who other
wise follow the symbolic interactionist approach".
(Blumer,1969b:5, my emphasis).
15. Manis and Meltzer, 1970:1, Manfred H. Kuhn, 1970:51.
16. Manfred H. Kuhn, 1970:48-52.
He notes that the con
fusion can be summed up as a contradiction between
determinacy and indeterminacy "in Mead's overall
point of view"(48).
17. Many of Blumer's essays include some statements con
cerning methodology.
These are frequently found in
conjunction with criticisms of other "conventional"
methods.
18. This term appears in Cooley's "The Roots of Social
Knowledge": 80.
Blumer refers to a "creative pro
cess". (Blumer, 19695:135).
19. Blumer, 19695:118,119,125.
He notes that the term
'subjective' can be used in at least two ways.
One,
the legitimate use, in his opinion, which acknow
ledges that social action has 'meaning' for the
participants; and the "worst kind of subjectivism"
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in which the observer uses his own concepts and
categories in describing the behavior of the
actors (p 86,74,51)
A number of other sociologists have also stres
sed that human behavior can only be understood when
we have knowledge of what the participants consider
to be significant.
Max Weber states:
...knowledge of cultural events is
inconceivable except on the basis
of the significance which the con
crete constellations of reality
have for us in certain individual
situations....................... .
"Culture" is a finite segment of
the meaningless infinity of the
world process, a segment on which
human beings confer meaning and
significance.
(Weber,1949:80-81),
Blumer acknowledges that others have emphasized the
subjective aspect of human behavior, (p 79), but he
claims that symbolic interactionism sees ’meaning'
as having a different source (Blumer, 1969b:3).
This view can easily lead to extreme positions.
For
example, Cooley has stated that: "the imaginations
people have of one another are the solid facts of so
ciety" (quoted by Martindale: 347): and Ernst Cassirer
observed: "Man does not live in a world of hard facts
... He lives rather in the midst of imaginary emo
tions, in hopes and fears... in his fantasies and
dreams" (Cassirer, 1944:25).
Blumer is aware that
this appears to be solipsistic and argues that it is
not so because the "empirical world c a n ’talk b a c k ’ to
our picture of it..." (Blumer, 1969b:22).
20.

Blumer, 19695:1,8,78,79,82.
Although he makes many
references to Mead, I do not wish to imply that all
M e a d ’s ideas have been adopted by Blumer.
Blumer
recently published a book (1969) entitled Symbolic
Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Since this
is his most recent work, other than an article on
Fashion, I have based most of my analysis on it.

21.

Blumer,

19695:79.
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22.

Blumer, 1969b:12.
He speaks of the 'self' mainly in
terms of its function.
In only one sentence does he
refer to the composition of the 's el f in terms of
the "I" and "Me" of Mead (p 111).
There is an ex
tensive body of philosophical literature concerning
the nature of mind, minds, self and consciousness.
A brief over-view is presented by Joseph Hospers in
An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, 2nd edi
tion, 1953,1957.
A lucid discussion concerning
'minds' is presented by John Wisdom, 1949; Other
Minds.

23.

Blumer, 19695:12,62,79.

24.

Blumer, 19695:80.

25.

Blumer, 19695:80;
83,85,96,97,111.

26.

Blumer, 19695:13.

27.

Blumer, 19695:61.

28.

Blumer, 19695:80;

29.

Meltzer thus criticizes Mead's analysis.
Meltzer, 1970:22.

30.

Blumer, 19695:97.
Blumer states that the participants
involved in social interaction have to "... arrest,
reorganize or adjust their own intentions, wishes,
feelings and attitudes" (66: my emphasis, see also: 82,
83,96,111,1137^
If all wishes and attitudes have to
be 'adjusted' their origin would seem to be irrelevant
for Blumer's theory.
It seems that the 'unconscious'
only becomes significant in social interaction if the
actor is unable to 'adjust' his attitudes.
Such a
state would be seen as pathological.

31.

Blumer, 19695:63.
He devotes one essay to an attack
on the belief that attitudes determine action: 90-100.
See also: 63,83,112,113,81,65.

32.

Blumer, 19695:63.

see also: 5,13,14,15,49,62,63,81,82,

see also: 13.
Manis and
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33.

Blumer, 1969b: 132, see also: 10,12,13,17,53,55,56,
66,67,79.
Blumer also uses the term "interpret" to
refer to the process whereby the actors involved in
interaction: "...build up their respective lines of
conduct by constant interpretation of each other's
ongoing lines of action", (p 66)

34.

Blumer,

1969b:80, see also: 49,134.

35».

Blumer,
1969b:68, see also: 134.
This definition
would seem to imply that attitudes, wishes and sen
timents are also 'objects': "An object... is...
anything that an individual indicates to himself"
(80).
The individual does indicate his attitudes
to himself when he modifies them (see note 30).

36.

Blumer, 1969b:10.
This would seem to
imply that
moral principles, being 'objects' and
hence 'human
constructs' are not derived from any source other
than the self.

37. :Blumer, 1969b:ll, also: 69.
38.

Blumer, 1969b:59, also: 11,12,17,19,67,69,71,132
and note 19.

39.

Blumer, 1969b:5, also: 71,86,110,111,132.

40.

Blumer, 1969b:135, also: 72,110,111,164-165.
The
structure of my sentence in the text is awkward be
cause it is not legitimate to refer to the 'meaning
of objects', since 'meaning' and 'object' are both
human constructs and are, it seems, synonymous (p
11).
It is not always clear whether Blumer always
uses the term 'object' as he defined it, or whether
he sometimes uses it in the standard way; referring
to things 'out-there'.
See also quotation in text
re 'recurrent affirmation' (note 54).

41.

Manis and Meltzer, 1970:22.

42.

Blumer, 1969b:110.
The following references do not
specify that the actor 'must' evaluate.
The state
ments usually just say that he does: 5,13,16,18,49,
53,55,62,63,80,64,69,81,85,86,95,96,97,98,111,114,
115.
See note 30 concerning the actor's evaluation
and control of attitudes.
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43.-

44.

Perhaps only the relative degree of sentiment Is at
tached.
Blumer does not state that the actor can
'create* sentiments such as love and hate.
He does
say that such sentiments can be rejected (p 81).
Blumer, I969b:ll3, also: 81,94-97.
Whenever the actor
is engaged in social interaction, there is also oc
curring a process of self-interaction (p 111).
He dis
cusses the dependency of attitudes only in relation to
the subsequent actions of the actor.
He does not ex
plicitly refer to the 'existence' of attitudes; that
is, to their ontological status.
To do so would in
volve him in the problem of how we know the content of
'other minds' when there are no physical clues (see
note 22). He has frequently noted that concepts such
as 'attitude' and 'sentiment' have no clear empirical
reference.
See pages 91,92,130,145, and the foot-note
on p 45 for statements concerning the empirical re 
ferents of attitudes.
See pages 33,45,129,143,146,
173 for his statements about concepts and empirical
referents.

45.

"Social scientists and psychologists are invited, in
deed beseeched, to observe their own social action
and see if this is not true".
(Blumer, 1969b:55, my
emphasis).

46.

Blumer, 1969b :14,15,16,18,19,30,53,57,59,65,66,73,74,
75,76,83,87,106,107,114,115,116,127-139.

47.

Blumer, 1969b:58.

48.

Blumer, 1969b:87.

49.

Blumer, 1969b:59, also: 17,18,67,71,75,86,106,110,
115,134.
He does state that 'structure', i.e. roles,
norms, values, etc., are important, but: "...only as
they enter into the process of interpretation and de
finition..." (p 75).
He does not explain this state
ment except to note that there are ritualistic rela
tions.
He does assert that organizations supply
"fixed sets of symbols"(p 88).
See also subsequent quotation re 'recurrent affirma
tion' (footnote 54).

50.

Blumer, 1969b:115, also: 75.
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51.

Blumer, 1969b:88.

52.

Blumer, I969b:20.

53. Blumer, 1969b:106.
Additional references to ’history;
are made on pp 47,60,71,77,193.
54.

Blumer, 1969b:67,

also:

18.

55.

Blumer, 1969b:71.
There is also the problem of deter
mining 'which history’ he is referring to, i.e. the use
of ’thé'history of a social movement (p 47), or 'its'
history (p 20) would seem to assume that there are
historical 'facts’ or 'events', which have the same
'meaning' (or significance) to all people.
Yet this
appears to conflict with the basic postulate that
'objects' are created by individuals: "An object may
have a different meaning for different individuals"
(p 11); (or groups, p 69)

56.

Blumer, 1969b:17,
see also: 8,12,13,15,16,18,20,49,50,
54 ,56 ,57,5 9,6 4-6 8,70 -77 ,86 ,87,90-.00.

57. Blumer, 1969b:85.
He states that Mead saw the social
act as the fundamental unit of society (p 70, also p
8 ). He also states :
A cardinal principle of symbolic
interactionism is that any empirical
ly oriented scheme of human society,
however derived, must respect the
fact that in the first and last
instances human society consists of
people engaging in action (p7).
Blumer does not, however, provide criteria to distinguish
one 'act' from another 'act', or 'act' from 'acts'.
58. Blumer, 1969b:13.
He also states: "Fundamentally, action
on the part of a human being consists of taking account
of various things he notes..." (p 15, see also p 83).
59. Blumer uses the term 'action' to refer to both overt
physical actions, which would include speech, and co
vert actions, such as 'self-indications'.
This is per
haps why there are no clearly defined limitations in
his presentation.
The process of 'self-indication'
would seem to have no limitations, except logical ones,
such as round-squares, etc.
I may, for example, define
myself as Napoleon Bonaparte, although if I also present
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this definition to the world the consequences may be
other than I expected.
Overt physical actions appear to be more re
stricted; I am, for example, unable to levitate, un
able to travel from Canada to Australia in less than
a certain period of time, and unable to live on air.
In this sense we can say that there are cultural uni
versels; e.g. all humans eat, no human levitates.
We
could also perhaps specify the necessary chemical
composition of the stuff that all humans must ingest.
However, we could not say that all humans evaluate
the edibility of their environment by the same cri
teria; there are variations from culture to culture.
We, for example, do not eat rats.
Blumer refers to
this cultural variations when he states that while
'attitudes* and 'feelings' are "...presumably pre
sent and in operation in all human societies" there
are many societies in which some particular form of
expression of an 'attitude' is absent (he is referring
to the phenomena of "Fashion': Blum er:"Fashion,"285).
Furthermore, as Steward has observed, behavior which
is universal must have a different explanation than
behavior which varies from culture to culture.
(Steward, 1970:8f).
60.

Blumer's view differs sharply from the common view
that "actions speak louder than words".
R.M. Hare
expressed this view in "The Language of Moral s":
If we were to ask a person 'What
are his moral principles?'
The
way in which we would be most
sure of a true answer would be
by studying what he d i d . (Hare;
1952:1).
Blumer might, however, point out that this is merely
the way one group evaluates the relative significance
of action versus speech (see note 55).

61.

Blumer, 1969b: 8-9, 66-67.

62.

Blumer, 1969b:8.

63.

Blumer,

1969b:66.

i nv olv e

a logical

64.

Non-symbolic interaction appears to
cont rad ict io n.

"The word, then, is a symbol of a given process of con
ception.
By reason of its verbal or symbolic character,
..." (Blumer, 1969b:159).
This would seem to indicate
that Blumer equates 'verbal' with 'symbolic'.
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65.

Blumer, 1969b:76.

66.

Blumer, 1969b:77.
This suggests that the most basic
reason Is fear; fear that one might not survive if one
ignores the wishes of others.
The concepts in the
following quotation do not emphasize any form of
altruism:
The participants may fit their acts
to one another in orderly joint
actions on the basis of compromise,
out of duress, because they may use
one another in achieving their
respective ends, because it is the
sensible thing to do, or out of
sheer necessity. (Blumer, 1969b:
76, my emphasis) Cf quotation
(footnote 30) on page 4 of this
thesis.

67.

Blumer, 1969b:77.
The concept ’action' connotes move
ment and change: "...human groups or society exists in
action" (Blumer, 1969b:6).

68.

Blumer, 1969b: 48.

69'.

Blumer, 1969b: 49.

70.

Blumer, 1969b: 34.
The phrase is repeated twice on this
page.
Similar proposals appear on pages: 21,23,27,33,
35,37,38,47,49,55,60.

71.

Blumer, 1969b: 42.
It is not clear how distinctions
can reduce the need for explanations, e.g. a descrip
tion can answer the question "What's going on here?'”
but only if it is an elliptical explanation - an
"explanation-sketch". If there is a valid difference
between descriptions and explanations, and Hempel as
sumes that there is, as will be discussed in Chapter
III, then no description can eliminate the need for
explanations.

72.

Blumer, 1969b:.43.
Cf. "Concepts, which in the last
analysis are our analytical elements", p 45.

73.

Both of these essays are reprinted in his latest book:
Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Meth od .
"Sociological Analysis and the 'Variable'", pp 127-139.
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73.

For his statement about generic see p 129.
"What is
Wrong with Social Theory?", pp 140-152.
For his
statement concerning fixed denotation see p 147.

74.

Blumer,

I969b:4.

75.

Blumer,

1969b:5.

76.

Stebbins, 1969:208.

77.

Blumer,

I969h:82.

78.

Blumer,

1969b:52.

79.

Blumer,

1969b:96.

80.

Blumer,

1969b:12.
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CHAPTER II

DISTINCTIONS,

LANGUAGE AND OBJECTS

In the preceding chapter, it was observed that the
'meanings* that are attached to objects or situations have
two sources:

l) the process of social interaction (see

footnote 38, chapter I) and 2) the process of self-indi
cation of the individual actor (see footnote 39, chapter
I).

However, Blumer emphasizes that the primary source of

'meaning'

is the individual:

social actions are joint actions

built out of the interlinkage of the separate acts of the
participants (see footnote 56, chapter I).
therefore, upon the private

The emphasis is,

'meanings' that the individual

attaches to objects and it is these private

'meanings' that

may become joint 'meanings' if others reaffirm them.

Of

course, if there exists a group of people, rather than an
aggregate, there will be shared 'meanings'

as shared 'mean

ings' are often one of the defining characteristics of
groups.

This is not to deny that children learn the 'mean

ings' of sounds from adults:
ings'.

sounds that have shared 'mean

But, as Humpty Dumpty suggested to Alice:

'words'

can mean whatever one wants them to mean.
It was also observed that Blumer denies that 'meanings'
are determined by pre-existing factors;

and it was suggested

27
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that the relationship between the ’status’ of objects
and the process of self-indication is a crucial factor
that must be considered in all explanations of social be
havior.
Blumer’s position can be contrasted with the fol
lowing assertion of Winch, a scholar who also sees that
social behavior is characterized by a subjective factor:
Our idea of what belongs to the
realm of reality is given for us
in the language that we use.
The
concepts that we have settle for
us the form of the experience we
have of the world. (1, my emphasis)

^

W i n c h ’s statement ignores the existence of the pro
cess of self-indication and implies that once the researcher
has learnt the ’language’ of a group he will also know how
that group perceives ’reality’.

While it appears, at first

sight, that a knowledge of the gro u p ’s "concepts" will show
the researcher how that group views
will show

’reality’, or at least

the limits within which their view of ’reality’

can beperceived,

it is not

clear how the introduction of the

’process of self-indication’ modifies this relationship be
tween language and objects.
This chapter will attempt to delineate more precisely
the concept ’process of self-indication’, examine its re
lationship to language, and delineate the ways in which it
modifies the language-object relationship.
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It will be argued that the ability used to make
self-indications is the same as that used to make dis
criminations, and the same as that used to make distinc
tions; and that these actions are all forms of rule-fol
lowing behavior.

Two uses of the term ’distinction’ will

be delineated and these will be shown to be similar to
the usage of the terms Emic and Etic.
The relationship between logical rules and language
will be discussed, and it will be argued that some logical
rules are apriori; and that consequently all actions will
be perceived as employing the same logic.

This renders the

symbolic-nonsymbolic dichotomy void for the study of social
behavior.

It will be shown that no unique relationship can

be ascertained to exist between ’words'

and 'objects' and

that, although it is necessary to learn the language of the
group, it is impossible to eliminate some indeterminacy of
’meaning’ of any statement within the language: the mapping
of their ’cognitive structure’ must be equally indeterminate.
Blume r’s assertion that moral principles are human
constructs will be shown to be congruent with the antinaturalistic ’noncognitive’ meta-ethical theories of ethics.
However, before proceeding with the analysis as out
lined, it is necessary to note that Wittgenstein has argued
against the possibility of a private language and against
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the idea of private objects;
Always get rid of the idea of the
private object in this way: assume
that it constantly changes, but
that you do not notice the change
because your memory constantly de
ceives you. (2N)
Wittgenstein’s discussion of the concept

’private

language’ involves an analysis of what it means to follow
a rule.

Language is considered to be a form of rule-gov

erned behavior; language game(3).

The possibility of a

private language is dependent upon the possibility of pri
vate rules.
Wittgenstein’s argument against the idea of a pri
vate language can perhaps be circumvented by differentiat
ing between ’u s e ’ and ’men tion ’.

That is, the difference

between an actor’s ’u s e ’ of a private language and our
’me nti on’ (talk) of the act o r ’s use(4N).
Wittgenstein’s argument is directed against a par
ticular kind of private language; a language that is not
only not understood by anyone else, but that cannot be
understood by anyone other than the speaker (5).

This

restriction seems unusual as it would at first sight ap
pear that we could arrive at some understanding of the
actor’s private language by just observing the situations
of his utterances

(6N).

Wittgenstein attempts to refute
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this suggestion by presenting an analysis of the concept
’r u l e ’.

His analysis rests upon the intersubjective prin

ciple of verification.

To talk meaningfully of rules, it

is necessary that it should be possible (in principle) to
verify our statements:
The proof that I am following
a rule must appeal to some
thing independent of my im
pression that I am (7)
Wittgenstein illustrates the necessity of this con
dition by stating that the concept

’r u l e ’ is logically re

lated to the concept ’mis ta ke ’: a rule is something that
can be followed correctly or incorrectly, and if there is
no way of proving whether someone is following a rule cor
rectly or not, it is meaningless to talk of ’rul es’(S).
He also argues that it is not possible to use one memory
to verify another.

He gives as an example the act of re

collecting the departure time of a train, and asks whether
the recollection can be checked by recalling a memory of a
page of the time table:
...this process has got to pro
duce a memory which is actually
correct. If the mental image of
the time table could not be
tested for correctness, how
could it confirm the correct
ness of the first memory? (9)
Wittgenstein differentiates between ’thinking’ that
one is following a rule, and ’obeying’ a rule:
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And to think one is obeying a
rule is not to obey a rule.
Hence it is not possible to
obey a rule ’privately'; other
wise thinking one was obeying a
rule would be the same thing as
obeying it. (10)
Wittgenstein’s argument can now be seen to rest upon
the concept of ’pro of ’: a proof is only a proof if
intersubjactively verifiable (11).

it is

If we now stipulate,

as he does, that a private language is only a private lan
guage if it is not intersub.jactive, the private language is
not open to this type of proof (see footnote 11N).
It should be noticed that in the last quotation,
Wittgenstein does not argue against the possibility that
an actor may think that he is following a rule, nor that
the actor may believe that he is correctly following a
private rule; but only that neither we nor he can verify
it (intersubjectively).
Wittgenstein's argument relies heavily upon the be
lief that memories can be false, and this is obviously often
the case.

However, it must also be acknowledged that an

individual’s memory is not entirely capricious; if it were,
there would be no principle of intersubjectivity.

This

principle itself rests upon the belief that memory is re
liable most of the time for most people.
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Wittgenstein's argument, therefore, does not elimi
nate the possibility that an actor can redefine a situation
or create a private object.

It does show that, over a

period of time, an actor may recall that definition 'false
ly', i.e. in a way that we, as observers (with a perfect
memory?), but not the actor,

see as inconsistent with his

original definition.
Blumer asserts that the actor, by means of the pro
cess of self-indication, attaches

'meaning' to objects:

The nature of an object - of any
and every object - consists of
the meaning that it has for the
person for whom it is an object.

(12)
And,

since objects have no intrinsic

'meanings', if

the actor ceases to attach significance to 'it', then 'it'
ceases to be an object: it becomes indistinguishable from
the "meaningless infinity of the world process".
cess of creating an object, or of attaching
therefore a process which involves

The pro

'meaning', is

'selecting'

some aspect

of the 'meaningless infinity' and, at the same time, at
taching some 'meaning' to 'it'.

The actor distinguishes

that which is itself undistinguished.

If we ignore the

apparent solipsism it will be as equally valid to assert
that the actor makes a distinction as it is to assert that
he indicates something to himself.

It is because the term
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’something’ occurs in English after the verb ’indicate’
that there is a tendency to assume that some ’thi ng ’ is
just waiting

’out-there’ to be indicated.

of using the phrase

The advantage

'make a distinction' is that it does

not make such a forceful ontological commitment.

In ordi

nary usage the term 'distinction' refers to discriminations
that people make; and it is often acknowledged that the
distinctions that one person makes may not be shared by
another.
It will be assumed in this thesis that the process of
making a distinction is the same as the process of self
indication: that both are a result of an inherent capacity
(13N).
The concept ’distinction’ can be used in at least two
different ways: ways that correspond to the two different
sources of ’meanings’ that Blumer delineates.

It can be

used to refer to those aspects of the ’meaningless infinity'
... that a group

has distinguished and for which it has

coined names, e.g. if a group distinguishes between what we
call

'cats' and 'dogs’, they will, in all probability, have

distinct

’wor d s ’ to name these 'objects’.

It is this usage

that Winch speaks of in the quotation on page 28: these
shared ’meanings’ of a group.

The Ethnosemanticists refer

to these distinctions as Emic distinctions:
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Emic statements refer to logicoempirical systems whose phenomenal
distinctions or 'things’ are built
up out of contrasts and discrimi
nations significant, meaningful,
real, accurate, or in some other
fashion, regarded as appropriate
by the actors themselves. (14)
The second usage of the term ’distinction’ refers to
the individual’s act of making a distinction: a distinction
that need not have previously been made by other members of
the group.

This act, however, has two aspects:

aspect and an emotive aspect.
in the action of making

The former aspect is apparent

’stipulative definitions': the in

troduction of new terms,
descriptive statements

a cognitive

say in science, which replace long
(15N) . The second aspect of 'making

a distinction’ refers to the action of attaching significance
(emotive) to some 'thing'.

One way of understanding this

usage of the term 'distinction' is to note that, according
to some philosophers, no value or moral prescription can be
inferred from any factual description

(16N).Therefore, when

an actor makes a distinction, he is saying (to

himself at

least) that something is noteworthy; he is carrying out a
process of grading

(17N).

Blumer emphasizes that the actor

must appraise every situation in order to be able to act, or
to continue acting (18N).

In a similar vein, Rescher argues

that in order for an actor to plan his future actions he, the
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actor, must evaluate alternatives which are mutually ex
clusive (19).
The cognitive aspect of the second usage of the term
’distinction’ is similar to the Ethnosemanticists’ usage
of the term Etic:
Etic statements depend upon pheno
menal distinctions judged approp
riate by the community of scientific
observers.
Etic statements cannot
be falsified if they do not conform
to the actor's notion of what is
significant, real, meaningful, or
appropriate, (20)
If we allow the other group, the ’community of scienti
fic observers’, to consist of only one person (a singleton
set), then Etic distinctions correspond to the distinctions
drawn by an individual actor; and, in effect, involve an
alternate
actor.

’redefinition’ of the situation by an observer-

It should be noted that in those cases where the

’redefinition’ of the situation agrees with the definition
of the situation agrees with the definition of the situation
gigen by the group he is studying, the Emic-Etic dichotomy
fuses.

For instance, if a scientific observer studies his

fellow scientific observers, and uses their conceptual
scheme in his analysis, there is no difference between Etic
and Emic (21N).
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The two uses of the term ’distinction' delineated
will be called ’distinction A ’ a n d ’distinction B ’.

The

term ’distinction B ’ will be used, unless otherwise in
dicated,

to refer to both the cognitive and emotive aspects

of making a distinction.

The rejection of an existing dis

tinction will also be considered as a case of ’making a
distinction’.

Since there are no intrinsic distinctions,

it would be inappropriate to say that an actor ’failed’ to
make a distinction (22N).

The use of the term ’fa i l ’ would

also not be congruent with Blumer’s emphasis upon the pro
cess of self-indication.

These uses of the term ’dis

tinction’ and the use of the terms Emic and Etic, imply
that it is often possible to describe, or perceive,
’state of affairs’ in more than one way.

some

For example,

Edward Sapir observed that an anthropologist would mis
describe an ’event’ if he was not aware of those aspects
of it which were

’meaningful' to the natives:

He will find interesting what the
natives take for granted... and he
will utterly fail to observe the
crucial turning points in the
course of the action that gives
formal significance to the whole
... (23)
In more general terms some philosophers,
Thomas Kuhn,

such as

state that any ’event’ can be described in

at least two ways (24).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38

If it is the case that an ’event’ or an ’action’ can
be described in more than one way, it is possible that the
’logic ’ of the ’event’ can also vary.

It has been argued

that the principles of logic arise, in some way, out of the
rules of language, i.e. that linguistic rules entail logical
principles (25), and since linguistic rules can vary, the
logical rules might also vary.

For example, Kenneth Burke

suggests that our concept of negation is derived from
language :
... dramatism is devoted to a stress
upon the all-importance of the nega
tive as a specifically linguistic
invention...(26, my emphasis)
The belief

that language rules entail logical rules

appears to commit us to the view that there could be a ’prelogical’ language (27N).

This opinion was at one time pro

posed by Levi-Bruhl, and has recently been proposed by Paul
Watzlawick.

He differentiates two codes of communication:

verbal and non-verbal, and describes non-verbal codes as
analogic.

He asserts that analogic codes are unable to

express negatives and are therefore ambiguous.

He illust

rates this by observing that a clenched fist can indicate
either anger or restraint, tears can be of sorrow or joy,
and a smile may convey sympathy or contempt (28).
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The view that logical principles are derived from
our language rules has been called ’linguistic-conventionalism’, and this position has been supported by P.F.
Strawson (29).

An alternative position, proposed by

David Mitchell and others, is that logical principles are
’a priori’: unlearnt and therefore unteachable (30).

The

difference between these two theories is considerable and
neither has a clear superiority.

However, Mit chell’s is

more congruent with the arguments of Blumer and Quine and
is therefore presented here.
One way of expressing the difference between these
two positions is to ask, is it necessary, or merely con
tingent, that a language have incompatible predicates?
That is, ^

^

decide whether or not there are to be

boundaries limiting the applicability of predicate words,
in addition to deciding where they are to be drawn.
Mi tchell’s argument is that boundaries are necessary, al
though we decide where the boundary is to be:
... if a word were applicable to
anything whatever, it would be
useless for the purposes of des
cription.
... boundaries
for the applica
tion of words are and must be
drawn somewhere. (31)
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Mitchell observes that the linguistic-conventionalism theory require that negative propositions constitute
a type of affirmative propositions, and he asserts that
this argument is unacceptable (32).
Using Blumer’s terminology we can ask, is it pos
sible for an actor to indicate something to himself and
yet in so doing not exclude what he indicates from the
"meaningless infinity of the world process?"

Mitchell

states :
Negation cannot be explained away:
it is implicit in all determinate
thought whatsoever.
For there is
no such thing as pure affirmative
thought.
To understand what it is
for an affirmative proposition to
be true is in part to understand
that its negation is false.
To
see. that ’p ’ is true is to see
that ’not-not-p’ is true.
Affir
mation and negation are complementory concepts neither of which
is intelligible in isolation.
The
function of negation is to exclude
and this function of exclusion, as
Mr. Strawson himself has said, is
implicit in all descriptive uses
of language and, in fact, in all
expression of thought whatsoever.
(33N)
The position expressed in this quotation can be con
trasted with the quotation (given earlier) from Kenneth
Burke.

In particular, Mitchell ’s assertion that affirma

tion and negation "are complementary concepts neither of
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which is intelligible in isolation",

suggests that Bur k e ’s

stress upon the "all-importance" of the negative is inap
propriate.

Mitchell’s argument also conflicts with

Watzlawick’s argument.

A code of communication,

in order to

be able to express affirmative propositions, must be able to
express negative propositions:
to see that

"To see that

’p ’ is true is

’not-not-p’ is true".

If logical principles are ’apriori’ and not derived
from language rules, language cannot be considered a neces
sary condition for the manifestation of logical behavior.
Entities that do not manifest any language-using ability
may have the ability
Furthermore,

to manifest rule-following behavior.

if logical principles are ’apriori’, we would

be forced to interpret any other logic, if we assume that
there could be such a variant logic, by means of our logic
al rules (34N).
Blumer implies that the process of self-indication
is specifically human ability and suggests, in his dis
cussion of symbolic and non-symbolic action, that animals
exist in a non-symbolic

’w o r l d ’.

However, we do attribute

to animals the ability to make discriminations: Lindesmith
and Strauss assert that it has always been known that ani
mals could discriminate:
beds (35N).

for example, between chairs

and

If, as has been argued here, the ability used
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to make distinctions (36N) is the same as that used to make
discriminations, then animals do not appear to differ from
humans in this respect (37N).
However,

if everything including

’objects'

is symbolic,

then defining a ’w o r d ’ by pointing to some object, for ex
ample to define the word ’t r e e ’ by pointing to a ’physical
t r e e ’ is to establish a relationship between two human con
structs, two symbols; and this establishes a syntactical
relationship (38N).

That is, since both ’words'

and ’ob

jects’ are human constructs, the establishment of a relation
ship between them is an assertion concerning the syntacticality of two symbols (human constructs).
While it is usually assumed that there is some defi
nite relationship between language and ’reality ’, there is
no consensus among philosophers concerning this relation
ship.

There are various theories of meaning

(39N), and al

though none are considered adequate, there appears to be
some agreement that the most basic use of the term ’mean
i n g ’ occurs in ostensive definitions:
The notion lingers that to each
statement, or each synthetic
statement, there is associated
a unique range of sensory
events...(40)
Blumer, in asserting that both 'words’ and ’objects’
are human constructs, has eliminated the touchstone of
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’reality’ from ostensive definitions.

Definitions are now

a process of correlating one human construct with another
human construct: the same process that occurs in syntactics.
A congruent analysis of the relationship between

’w o r d s ’

and ’objects’ has been developed by Willard Van Orman Quine,
and some congruent observations have also been made by
Peter Wegner.

Both of these authors minimize the significance

of semantical relationships, thereby corroborating Blumer’s
viewpoint.
Q u i n e ’s analysis is subtle and complex and any brief
outline is bound to distort it.

However,

its importance(41N)

warrants an attempt and it may be possible to convey his
basic ideas by looking at two parts of his analysis:
his delineation of the usage of the
his analysis of what is

one,

term ’meaning’,and two,

involved in the process of making

ostensive definitions.
Quine observes that the term ’meaning’ is normally
used in two ways:
...the having of meanings, which
is significance, and the sameness
of meaning, or synonomy...
If we
are allergic
to meanings as such,
we can speak
directly of utterances
as significant or insignificant,
and as sy no n y mo us or he t e r o n y m o u s
one with another.
The problem of
explaining these adjectives ’sig
nificant’ and ’synonymous’ with
some degree of clarity and rigor preferably, as I see it, in terms
of behavior - is as difficult as
it is important.(42)
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It should be noted that my use of the term ’sig
nificant’ in

this paper is not

the same as Q u i n e ’s use

of it in the

above quotation.

For Quine,

is an all or

nothing term, whereas

of degree.

Furthermore,

I use

’significance’

for me, it is a question

the term ’significance’ to

denote the emotive aspect of an expression, as well as its
’cognitive meaning’

(43N),

’Significance’, for Quine, is that aspect of language
which is studied by grammarians :"the grammarian wants to
know what forms are significant,

or have meaning"

(44).

His analysis shows that the grammarian must study phonemes,
and the criteria of what is to count as one phoneme or as
two slightly different phoemes depends upon the concept of
sameness of meaning,

synonomy

(45N).Quine discusses vaious

types of synonomy: cognitive synonomy:

stimulus synonomy;

statement synonomy, as related to the verification theory
of meaning, and analytical synonomy.
His examination of stimulus synonomy involves the
analysis of the relationship between a ’w o r d ’ and some
’sensory d a t a ’ (i.e. ostensive definition).

He examines

the methods a linguist would use to learn, in a radically
different language, the relationship between the appearance
of what seems to the linguist to be a rabbit and the noise
(utterance) of the natives who apparently see the rabbit.
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He shows that it would not be possible for the linguist
to decide whether a particular utterance refers to
bit,

rabbits,

rab

stages of rabbits, integral parts of rab

bits, the rabbit fusion, or rabbithood (46).

Quine con

tinues by discussing the problems involved in translating
analytical sentences:

sentences that are synonymous and

which are only indirectly related to experience (47).

He

concludes that there is still a systematic indeterminacy as
to whether the translation is correct:
We may alternately wonder at the
inscrutability of the native
mind and wonder at how very much
like us the native is, where in
one case we have merely muffed
the best translation and in the
other case we have done a more
thorough job of reading our own
provincial modes into the na
t i v e ’s speech. (48N)
Quine acknowledges that he studied the translation
of exotic languages because the factors involved would be
more visible.

However,

"the main lesson to be learned con

cerns the empirical slack in our own beliefs"

(49). In his

essay "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism", he concludes:
My present suggestion is that it
is nonsense, and the root of
much nonsense, to speak of a
linguistic component and a
factual component in the truth
of any individual statement.
The idea of defining a symbol in
use was, as remarked, an advance
over the impossible term by term
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empiricism of Locke and Hume.
The statement, rather than the
term, came with Bentham to be
recognized as a unit account
able to an empiricist critique.
But what I am now urging is that
even in taking the statement as
a unit we have drawn our grid
too finely.
The unit of empirical
signifie nee is the whole of
science......................
The totality of our so-called
knowledge or beliefs... is a manmade fabric which impinges on ex
perience only along the edges.
(s o n )
It is important to note that this

’systematic in

determinacy’ is also an intralinguistic phenomena.

That

is, since many statements in our language are only in
directly related to sensory data, these statements could
’m e a n ’ different things to different people, and we would
not be able to decide which of these possible

’meanings’

was correct:
If we were perverse and ingenious
we could... devise other analytical
hypotheses that would attribute un
imagined views to our compatriot,
while conforming to all his dis
positions to verbal response to all
possible stimulations. (51N)
Quine acknowledges that if two theories are empirical
ly equivalent, then they may as well be considered one theory.
However, his major point is that it is logically possible that,
given two theories that agree empirically, there need be little
or not agreement between, for instance, their conceptions of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

rabbits, rabbit stages, etc., and in particular that there
is no^ way of deciding which of the possible interpretations
is the correct one.

Quine comments:

I am not sure that it even
makes sense to ask. (5 2 N )
Neither sentence nor terms can be considered to con
vey meaning severally; the meaning is conveyed only when the
statement or term is considered in conjunction with the whole
body of knowledge of the group (culture).

The usual dichotomy

between ’w o r d s ’ and ’things’ is no longer significant: there
is no ascertainable correlation between the ’meaning’ of a
’w o r d ’ and any ’object’.
Q u i n e ’s analysis is corroborated by Peter We gn e r ’s
study of computer languages.

In his discussion he observes

that expressions (of a specified computer language) are de
fined in terms of the way they may be transformed into other
expressions

(of that language).

He acknowledges that this

seems ’circular’ and that it would seem better to define the
’meaning’ of the expressions by stating their correspondence
to a ’predefined class of objects’.

However, he asserts that

it would be less useful:
... semantic definitions of languages
in terms of the transformational pro
perties of expressions of the language
are generally more useful than semantic
definitions in terms of class of objects.
(53)
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W e g n e r ’S comments are essentially pragmatic, he does
not explain why semantic definitions are less useful.

Ho w

ever, Q u i n e ’s analysis would appear to be as relevant to
computer languages as it is to natural languages
The analysis of Quine

(and Waisman,

(54N)>

see footnote 54)

suggests that ostensive definitions are of limited useful
ness; even intralinguistically there remains the possibility
of a ’systematic indeterminacy’.

While this may pose no

serious obstacles for the researcher who is merely re
cording the statements made by the natives in response to
questions

(55N)>it does pose a serious problem for those

who wish to ’get behind’ the utterances of the natives:
those who, like the ethnosemanticist, wish to map the ’cog
nitive systems’ of the natives

(56N). They will be unable,

it seems, to determine whether the natives conceive of rab
bits, or rabbit stages, or rabbithood,

etc., and when they

attempt to delineate some of the native’s more intangible
concepts,

such as gods, spirits,

love, etc., they will be

"floating free of fact, and the best (they) can do is to
"ensure consistency".

(Scheffler,

see footnote 50N).

The foregoing discussion suggests that we can expect
researchers to come up either with data that seem incon
sistent (57N), or with analyses that perceive a universal
logical structure (58N),
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This chapter has dealt with aspects of human be
havior which are considered to be ’rule-governed’.
as Wittgenstein’s remarks indicate,
type of rule-governed action.

And,

’distinctions’ are a

Rules, however, are neither

true nor false; they may be followed correctly or incor
rectly, but are justified only by their utility

(59N).

Moral principles are frequently conceived of as rules, but
there is some philosophical controversy as to whether these
rules can be derived from ’facts’ (empirical statements).
Blumer has asserted that moral principles are human con
structs (footnote 36, chapter I), and in this respect his
position appears similar to the views of some linguistic
philosophers, in particular to the "noncognitive" approach
of Charles L. Stevenson

(60N).

Stevenson suggests that there can be two kinds of
disagreement: a) in belief, and b) in attitudes.

People

may differ in their description of some ’event’, (i.e. in
belief), or they may agree ’in belief’ but differ in their
attitudes to the ’event’.

Stevenson states that there can

be no guarantee that agreement in belief will lead to agree
ment in attitude:
In considering whether a man is
courageous... the judgement is
only partly established... even
if we go on to describe - in
factual terms, and again with
empirical evidence - the exact
ways... in which he makes his
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stand against danger.
For
there will still be a question
as to whether these ways are
admirable ways. (61)
This argument, however,

leads to the conclusion that

in the last resort moral principles are nonrational.
Bertrand Russell at one time observed:
endsare not amenable to

rational

The "noncognitive" argument

As

"... questions of

argument"

(62N).

can be contrasted with

the following statement by Karl W. Deutsch in which he as
serts that values depend upon knowledge, and therefore upon
science:
... the knowledge of what ought
to be cannot be divorced from
the knowledge of what is... (63N)
'
is no

Deutsch’s argument obviously presupposes that
'systematic indeterminacy',

there

or ’open-texture’of

language; "facts are facts!"
The "noncognitive" metatheory has grave implications
for those who ask: "Why this rule... rather than some other
rule?"

W.H. Walsh argues that a "noncognitivist"must be

committed to the view that no objective historical know
ledge is possible; it is irreducibly subjective
historian has his own viewpoint,

(64), Every

and "since points of view

are, ultimately, not matters of argument... we cannot say
that one is 'objectively' better than another..."

(65).
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Walsh also notes that there is no such thing as "the"
evidence,

"... historians have to decide what they are to

treat as evidence..."

(66) and if historians should decide

something is not evidence, there is nothing anyone can do.
He also notes that comparisons between different versions
of the same set of events are impossible from this (non
cognitive) point of view (67),

It was noted in chapter I

that Blumer appeared ambivalent about
rical continuity.

history and histo

If, as I claim, his position concerning

moral principles is congruent with that of the

'noncognitive'

theorists, then the historical aspect of social behavior
cannot be scientifically objective (i.e. intersubjectively
valid).
Blumer has been criticized for overemphasizing the
role of consciousness in human action, and the linguistic
philosophers have been criticized for overemphasizing the
rule-following aspect of language.

Herbert Spiegelberg asks:

Who, especially in speaking his
mother tongue, is even impli
citly, let alone explicitly,
aware of the rules of this
language? (68)
Both of these criticisms suggest that many human acts
are nonconscious, or at least are ones of which the actor is
unaware.

Spiegelberg takes the "whole emphasis on rules...

to be something of a myth"

(69).

While it does appear
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ridiculous to suggest that the actor is aware of all the
relevant linguistic rules each time he utters a statement,
this does not refute the argument that language is rulegoverned.

Similarily, Bl um er ’s argument that a 'process

of self-indication' is involved in every action is not re
futed by showing that the actor is frequently unaware of
the process.

The question is whether he can become aware.

We have noted that everything for man is symbolic;
and one of the possible results of 'symbolism' is a re 
duction in the mental effort required for any actions.
Whitehead discusses the importance of symbolism in math
ematics and observes that it frees the mind of unnecessary
work and simplifies the procedures.

He states that it is

not desirable to think about what one is doing:
It is a profoundly erroneous
truism... that we should cul
tivate the habit of thinking
of what we are doing.
The
Precise opposite is the case.
Civilization advances by ex
tending the number of import
ant operations which we can
perform without thinking
about them. (70N)

^

The process by which actions become 'automatic' has
been termed "cognitive step-down transformation"

(_71N).

There are, it would seem, different degrees of trans
formation.

The use of mathematical symbols

'automatically',

for example, would appear to require a quite different
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degree of transformation than that involved in habit of
walking with a slouch.

The modification of one type of

’automatic’ action may be much more difficult than that of
another.

There may be some areas of life in which it is

as necessary to learn how to modify actions
as it is to learn how to perform actions

’automatically’,

’automatically’.

For instance, in mathematics, the use of symbols ’auto
matically' would seem to require also the ability to realize
’automatically' that the values of the symbols change from
situation to situation, equation to equation.

Social

interaction would be another area in which an inability to
modify actions would be maladroit.

That we do not ’thi nk’

while performing some acts is no proof that we are unable to.
In this chapter we have explored the implications of
Blumer’s notion that human action is essentially a "process
of self-indication" and have suggested that the existence of
this process seriously modifies the relationship commonly
assumed to exist between language and ’reality’.

The pro

cess of self-indication has been shown to be a form of rulefollowing action, and, if it occurs in all human action as
Blumer asserts, the study of social actions must employ
concepts and methods that take into account the nature of
rules.

The following chapter will examine the question:

"Why this rule... rather than some other rule?" and will
argue that rules, by their very nature, are not subsumable
under "covering law explanations".
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NOTES: C h a p te r I I

1.

Winch,

1967:15.

2.

Wittgenstein, 1953:207. (in Chappell, 1962:74-100) An
explication of Wittgenstein’s argument against the
possibility of a private language is presented by
Norman Malcolm, ’’Wittgenstein’s Philosophical In
vestigations", in Chappell, 1962:74-100)

3.

Wittgenstein, 1953:124,

4.

Wittgenstein's argument is complex and my refutation
may be erroneous.
Norman Malcolm admits that at times
he only dimly understands Wittgenstein, (p 89)

5.

Wittgenstein, 1953: paragraph 243.
This point is
explicated by Norman Malcolm (in Chappell, 1962)

6.

A similar observation was made by P.F. Strawson in his
review of Philosophical Investigations. (P.F. Strawson,
"Critical Notice: Philosophical Investigations", M i n d ,
LXIII. 1954, pp 70-99).
However, many of Wittgenstein's
statements refer to a private language in relation to
pain.
This relationship ;will not be discussed here.
Inasmuch as Wittgenstein himself refers to the many
different types of ’descriptions’, the exclusion of
a particular subject area is congruent with his philo
sophical position.
(Wittgenstein: paragraph 24).

7.

Malcolm, 1962:76.

8.

Wittgenstein, 1953 :paragraph 258.
this point.
Winch, 1964:32.

9.

Wittgenstein,

Winch also explicates

1953:paragraph 265.

10.

Wittgenstein, 1953:paragraph 202, see also paragraph 380,

11.

A brief discussion of the principle of intersubjectivity
can be found in Bochenski.
He observes:
According to the contemporary view
one should as far as possible make
use of such expressions as are re
latively easy for others to verify.
When formulated in this way the
rule holds good for all domains of
54
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11.

knowledge and should be rigidly
applied. (Bochenski, 1968:57)
However, it may not be appropriate for all types of
statements.
See Hospers, 1967:260-275.

12. Blumer, 1969b:ll.
13. Quine, in discussing how a child learns to associate the
sound "Mama" with the appearance of its mother, sug
gests that "we must credit the child with a sort of prelinguistic quality space", because: "He must, so to
speak,sense more resemblance between some stimulations
than between others.
Otherwise a dozen reinforcements
of his response ’r e d ’ on occasions where red things
were presented, would no more encourage the same response
to a thirteenth red thing than to a blue one".
Quine,
1960:83).
14. Harris,

1968:106.

15. For a brief discussion of ’stipulative definitions’
see Copi, 1968:97-98.
16. Bourke, 1970:144.
See also the subsequent discussion
in this thesis of Stevenson's "noncognitive" metaethical
theory of ethics.
Alston briefly discusses the dis
tinction drawn between the ’cognitive' and ’emotive'
meanings of statements.
See Alston, 1964:74-75,102.
17. Urmson has presented an analysis of this process.
See
Urmson in Flew, 1965:381-409.
Urmson discusses actions
which are obviously acts of grading, e.g. grading apples;
or which utilize the terms 'good', 'first class', 'bad',
etc.
He ignores the implicit grading process that oc
curs whenever an actor 'notes' something, and he there
fore asserts that a description is just a description,
(p 394 ). In asserting this he is overlooking the dis
tinction between 'use' and 'mention;.
The actor, in the
act of describing something (and describing only some of
the ’thing's’ manifold characteristics.
See chapter 3)
indicates that what he is saying is relevant to the
situation; that it is, at least, more 'important',
’releva nt' ,

'significant',

than

saying

and doing

nothing.

18. Blumer, 1969b:110.
He explicates this with reference to
the effects of hunger pains upon the subsequent actions
of an actor,
pp 95-96.
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19. Rescher,
20. Harris,

1964:8.
1968:109.

21. This is a point Harris does not discuss.
Alfred
Schütz suggests that the use of the terms ’sub
jective’ and ’objective' is unfortunate because
"... the term ’objective meaning’ is obviously a
misnomer in that the so-called ’objective’ inter
pretations are in turn relative to the particular
attitudes of the interpreters and therefore, in a
certain sense, ’subjective’". Schütz, in Hook,
1958:220)
22. Von Wright uses the word ’change' in this way:
"It is convenient, however, to use the word
'change' so that it includes also non-changes..."
(Von Wright, in Rescher, The Logic of Decision
mid Action : 121).
23. Quotation in Harris, 1968:105.
24. Thomas S. Kuhn, 1970:76.
25. Mitchell, 1970:156,139.
26. Burke, 1968:450.
27. Mitchell, 1970:152-153.
"For the conventionalist
claim is that we can get behind logic to that on
which it rests". (p 152)
28. Watzlawick,

1967:65.

29. P.F. Strawson.
London, 1952.

Introduction to Logical Theorv.

30.

Mitchell, 1970:174.

31.

Mitchell, 1970:151.

32.

Mitchell, 1970:153-154.

33.

Mitchell, 1970:155.
However, there was a time when the
idea of zero, a number expressing nothing, was in
conceivable.
It may happen that a language lacking
negation will be conceivable in the future.
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34. Quine,

in discussing ’radical’ translation, observes:
Wanton translation can make
natives sound as queer as
one pleases.
Better trans
lation imposes our logic
upon t h e m . ~ [Quine, 1960:58, my emphasis)

35. Lindesmith and Strauss,1952:274.
A.N. Whitehead ap
pears to be in agreement with this position when he
suggests that a puppy-dog "would have acted immediately
upon the hypothesis of a chair... It is not a mere
tropism, or automatic turning towards, because both
men and puppies often disregard chairs when they see
them".
(Whitehead, 1959:4)
36. There has recently been developed, by G. Spencer Brown,
a ’calculus of indications’, in which the idea of dis
tinction is taken as given:
We take as given the idea of
distinction and the idea of
indication, and that we can
not make an indication with
out drawing a distinction. (Brown, 1969:1)
37. Whether the difference between animals and humans is
qualitative is a controversial question.
Leslie White
discusses this question, presents the views of various
scholars, and opts for a qualitative difference: "...
animals cannot create or bestow new values", (pp 22-23)
There are, however, problems in ascertaining when and
if an animal has made an act of discrimination.
It
would seem that only if there is a repition can any
given action be described as purposeful rather than
random.
It should be noted that use of the term
’actio n’ with reference to animals often implies
•purposiveness.
(Hamlyn, 1962:60-73)
The qualitative-quantitative dichotomy may be ir
relevant: any language-using entity would need a
considerable minimum complexity, depending upon the
definition of language applied.
This minimum level
might appear as a qualitative difference.
38. Bochenski presents a brief discussion of syntactical
and semantical relationships.
Syntactic relation
ships link words to one another, semantic relation
ships relate words to objects.
See Bochenski, 1968:
32-34.
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39. Quine observes:
Pending a satisfactory explana
tion of the notion of meaning,
linguists in semantic fields
are in the situation of not
knowing what they are talking
about.
(Quine, 1963:47)
William Alston presents a brief review of the major
theories of meaning.
(Alston, 1964)
40. Quine, 1963:40.
41. Q ui n e ’s major work on this subject is Word and Object,
published in 1960.
This book, together with his many
articles, have received much attention.
In 1969, a
number of essays concerning Q u i n e ’s work were col
lected and published in book form. Words and Objactions : Essays on the Work of W.V. Qui ne ., eds.
D. Davidson and J. Hintikka.
Synthèse Library.
Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
42. Quine, 1963:11-12.
43. These two aspects of ’meaning’ are discussed by
Alston, 1964:45-48.
44. Quine, 1963:49.
45. Quine, 1963:50,54.
His analysis of ’significance’
shows that there is no way of specifying the suf
ficient and necessary conditions of sentences that
are ’significant’.
Mortimer Taube notes that Q u i n e ’s analysis makes a
’transformational gramm ar’, specifically Chomsky’s,
impossible.
(Taube, 1961:57)
46. Quine, 1960:52.
47. Quine, 1960:64.
48. Quine, 1960:77.
Some of the problems of translation
were outlined by Malinowski in his article: "The
Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages".
He saw
that no word for word translation was possible, but
did not see that some of the problems of translation
might be inherently insoluble.
(Malinowski, 1923:
296-236)
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49. Quine, 1960:78; my emphasis.
50. Quine, 1963:42.
Q u i ne ’s argument is congruent in
some respects with the Coherence theory of meaning:
"Our beliefs float free of fact, and the best we can
do is to ensure consistency among them".
(p 93)
Israel Scheffler, 1967: Science and Sub.jactivity.
Scheffler’s book delineates the controversy between
Coherence theorists and Correspondence theorists.
51. Quine, 1960:78.
’Analytical
that the linguist makes when
the native’s utterances into
he then equates with English
1960:68,61-72)

hypotheses’ are those
he attempts to break up
short ’w o r d s ’, and which
words or phrases. (Quine,

52. Quine, 1960:77.
The belief that it is useless to ask
questions for which there are no criteria that can be
used to evaluate answers is a characteristic of
linguistic philosophy:
But the only presupposition which
we must make is that if we have no
criteria for evaluating answers to
certain questions, then we should
stop asking those questions until
we do. (Rorty, 1967:14,4)
Q u i n e ’s work can be seen as part of a wide-spread
philosophical controversy concerning the methods and
problems of evaluating the validity of theories.
Thomas S. Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revo
lutions , discusses some of the problems involved in
assessing the validity of ’paradigms’. There have
been many other studies on this subject, including
Scheffler’s Science and Subjectivity. One of the
more extreme views has been proposed by P.K. Feyerabend.
He concludes that the problem of induction is insoluble.
He also argues that well confirmed theories are not ne
cessarily desirable.
(Feyerabend, 1968:12-39)
53. Wegner, 1970:29.
54. The possibility of translating a statement into terms
of se ns e- da ta has also been di s c u s s e d by Fr i e d r i c h
Waisman.
He claims that it has not been achieved be
cause our empirical statements have an ’open texture’;
that is, the terms which occur in it are non-exhaustive
and we cannot therefore "foresee completely all the
possible circumstances in which the statement is true
\.
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54. or in which it is false" (p.127).
He suggests that the
application of logic is limited; that the "...class of
premises is not ’closed' and that therefore the con
clusion is lacking stringency".
This, he observes, is
the same as saying "that S is not a logical consequence
of the premises as far as they are stated".
He con
cludes:
We may say that the known rela
tions of logic can only hold be
tween statements which belong to
a homogeneous domain; or that
the deductive nexus never ex
tends beyond the limits of such
a domain.
(Waisman, 1965:134)
55. There would seem to be at least two ways of viewing the
’fa c t ’ of ’systematic indeterminacy’:
A.
"For if we have not been aware of
the existence of a 'systematic
indeterminacy’ in our own use of
language, there is little reason
to suppose that any other group
will have perceived it".
B.
"Since we have always believed in
the "precision" of our own language
we may well have assumed that other
languages are equally ’precise’".
See Harris’s comments on kinship terminology,
footnote 57.
56. As described by Charles 0. Frake in "The Ethnographic
Study of Cognitive Systems".
He states that it is
important to determine the attributes that a group of
natives use.
His article appears in Readings in
Anthropology, vol.2. Morton H. Fried ed., pp 82-95.
57. Marvin Harris discusses the inconsistencies that occur
in Kinship terminology and argues that ambiguity may be
a characteristic of kinship terms.
(Harris, 1968:120)
58. Edmund Leach notes that Lévi-Strauss "tends to imply
... that the whole structure of primitive throught is
binary" (p 129).
Leach observes that even though dis
tinctions are of the either/or kind, humans can still
"cut up the cake of experience in quite different ways",
(Leach, I970a:128)
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59. Hospers, 1967:225.
However, they are frequently spoken
of as being ’tr u e ’ or ’false ’, e.g. if someone asserts
that it is wrong to steal, a common reply would be:
"That’s true".
See Stevenson, 1967:216-218)
60. Stevenson argues that the ’noncognitive’ (emotive) view
is "a nonnormative meta-theory of norms, its business
is not to make value judgments but only to survey and
clarify them". (Stevenson, 1967:90)
61. Stevenson, 1967:222.
62. Russell, 1965:58.
Russell defined three characteristics
of reason: l) It relies upon persuasion rather than
force; 2) It seeks to persuade by means of arguments
which the man who uses them believes to be completely
valid; 3) In forming opinions, it uses observation and
induction as much as possible and intuition as little as
possible.
(Ibid: 55-56)
63. Deutsch, 1966:148.
Within limited contexts, De utsch’s
argument may appear sound.
For example, the decision to
use pesticides must, it would seem, depend upon the
severity of any known ’side-effects’,it does not follow
that its use would be acceptable: religious or ethical
beliefs concerning the sanctity of life might rule out
its use as ’inconceivable’.
64. Walsh, 1958:110.
65. Walsh, 1958:113.
66. Walsh, 1958:116.
See footnote 55, chapter I for Blume r’s
very similar comments.
67. Walsh, 1958:115.
68. Spiegelberg, 1968:291.
69. Spiegelberg, 1968:292.
70. Whitehead, 1958:41-42.
For a similar argument concerning
the driving of cars and buses, see Lawrence LaFave, "The
Concept of Involuntary Non-Conformity in Social Sciences",
Symposia Studies Series of The National Institute of
Social and Behavioral Sciences, 1968.
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71, LaFave, see previous footnote.
LaFave also discusses
this concept in "Involuntary Non-Conformity as a
Function of Habit L a g " , in Perceptual and Motor Skills,
1967, no. 24. pp 227-234.
This process of cognitive step-down transformation
may be a cultural universal; that is, a universal
characteristic of man.
However, as Leach observes
(footnote 58) "the cake of experience" can be cut up
in different ways: actions which are 'automatic’ in one
society may not be in another.
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CHAPTER III
DISTINCTIONS: DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION

B l u m e r ’s emphasis upon the ’process of self-indica
tion’ and his denial of any significant distinction between
language and objects, was delineated in chapter I; some
corroborating views of other scholars were presented in
chapter II.

The process of ’making a distinction’ was seen

to be a form of rule-following, and some of the character
istics of rule-governed behavior will be more clearly de
lineated in this chapter (IN). The question still remains:
"Can Blu me r’s symbolic interactionism be a science?"

Blumer,

it was noted, answers in the affirmative but implies that
"fuller" descriptions might obviate the need for analytical
explanations.

While Blumer appears ambivalent concerning

the need for theoretical explanations, another sholar, Peter
Winch, who also saw social behavior as a form of rule-govern
ed behavior, has firmly asserted that nomothetic explanations
of social behavior are impossible.

Some of W i n c h ’s arguments,

and criticisms thereof, will be considered in this chapter’
for the light that they may throw upon the description and
explanation of social behavior.

Although it is conceptually

useful to distinguish ’descriptions’ from ’explanations’, it
should be kept in mind that whereas

’explanations’ presuppose

63
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’descriptions', the reverse is not necessarily the case.
Whether symbolic interactionism can be a science
will depend upon both the definition of the term ’science’
that is used and the nature of the 'process of self-indi
cation;.

The term ’.science’ has no clear denotation; the

distinction between ’scientific’ and ’non-scientific’
activities is by no means precise.

Michael Scriven ob

serves that science, as an activity "... is continuous with
the pre-scientific activities directed to the same ends"

(2).

Clifford Geertz suggests that there are close links between
science, magic and religion:

- -■

Myth, and in a slightly different
way, rite are systems that ...
permit the construction of a
’science of the concrete’ - the
intellectual comprehension of
the sensible world in terms of
sensible phenomena - which is no
less rational, no less logical,
no more affect-driven than the
abstract science of the modern
world. (3)

There are also differences of opinion as to the aims
of science.

Purtill, in a recent article,

suggests;

The basic aim of science is to
give an organized account of
whatever knowledge we can ob
tain about the universe. (4N)
This statement is almost identical in content to
G e e r t z ’s statement; voiding the science - non-science
dichotomy.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65

Within more limited contexts, the term ’science’ is
often used indiscriminately to refer to basic research,
applied research or technology.

Thomas S. Kuhn observes

that the term ’science’ is usually reserved for those
fields that do show progress, and that since progress is
an obvious attribute of both science and technology, the
profound differences between them are often ignored

(5).

Kuhn emphasizes the difference between basic and applied
research by observing that a great deal of resistance to
Darwin’s concept of evolution was because his concept had
no goal, in contrast to the many vague evolutionary schemes
that were current at that time.

Kuhn sees this non-goal

orientation as an essential characteristic of basic re
search and suggests that if we substitute "evolution-fromwhat-we-know" for "evolution-toward-what-we-wish-to-know",
a ’’number of vexing problems may vanish in the process"

(6).

One of K u h n ’s more important points is that he denies the
commonly assumed relationship between science and ’tru th ’.
He states that the concept of truth is not relevant to
scientific validity.

The process of verification involves

choosing between alternative solutions at a given time:
Whether that choice is the best
that could have been made if
still other alternatives had
been available, or if the data
had been of another sort is
not a question that can use
fully be asked. (7N)
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There is, however,

some controversy concerning the

criteria that a ’scientific’ explanation should fulfill.
The argument that has commanded the most respect is the
one put
This

forward by Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim (8),

is termed the ’covering-law’ model: a ’deductive-

nomological’ model (9N)

Hemp e l’s model involves nine

propositions, according to Krimmerman (10),of which the
fifth states that a scientific explanation, in order for
it to be acceptable, must subsume the event to be ex
plained under general laws.

Hempel states:

... all scientific explanations
and their everyday counterparts
claim or presuppose at least im
plicitly the deductive or induc
tive subsumability of whatever
is to be explained under general
laws or theoretical principles.
(11 )
Hempel observes that in developing his model, he
was attempting to construct a nonpragmatic model:
... the problem of constructing
a nonpragmatic conception of
sciencentific explanation - a
conception that requires re
ference to puzzled individuals
no more than does the concept
of mathematical proof - is

... (12 )
While

there are m a n y c ri ti ci sm s

of the covering-

law model, and many problems of the epistemology of laws
(13N), Hempel suggests that many of his critics "miss their
aim because they apply to nonpragmatic concepts of explana
tion certain standards that are proper only for a pragmatic
construal"

(14),
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Hempel’s model is valid if, and only if, the dis
tinction between pragmatic and nonpragmatic is valid in
relation to scientific explanations (as distinct from a
logistic system; an uninterpreted calculus).

In other

words, if all scientific explanations are irreducibly
pragmatic the objections of his critics may be valid

(15N),

The discussion in chapter II concerning Qu i n e ’s ’systematic
indeterminacy’, and the reference to Waisman’s ’opentexture’, suggests that scientific explanations may re 
fer to individuals in some way

(16N).

A scientific explanation does not ’explain’ some
’thin g’ which is ’out-there’ in all pristine purity and
totality.

It explains a description of a ’state of af

fairs’ or an ’event’, and descriptions refer only to a
part of the ’event’.

Morgenbesser states:

Let us begin by emphasizing the
trivial point that we never ex
plain an event as such, but only
selected aspects of it.
In
other words, it is not the event
itself that is explained but the
event under a given description.
(17)
The words used in a description, for example the
word

’t r e e ’, are general words: they refer to a class of

’events’, not to a particular ’event’.

If, as seems like

ly, there are no two things exactly alike, then when we
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use the word

’tr ee ’ in an observation-statement we have

classified some ’thing’ according to certain similarities
that it is perceived as sharing with other ’things’

(IBN).

If our explanation is to be nonpragmatic, then it is es
sential that our process of classification be nonpragmatic.
The process of classifying requires a knowledge of the "bond
by which members of a class are supposed to cohere together"
(19)
Satosi Watanabe, in a recent essay on pattern recogni
tion, observes that the relation of ’similarity’ is the major
factor used in classification.

He then proves that there can

be no logical basis for the idea of similarity

(20N),

From

this he deduces the Ugly Duckling Theorem:
Any pair of two objects are as
similar to each other as are any
other pair of two objects
(21)
Watanabe’s theorem would appear to severely limit the
validity of Hempel’s model

(22N),

If classification is a logically arbitrary process,
Watanabe’s Ugly Duckling Theorem appears also to put a limit
upon the development of covering-law explanations of pheno
mena which are Emically classified, i.e. the cognitive stu
dies of the ethnosemantlcists and of Lévi-Strauss, parti
cularly if we bear in mind Ayer% distinction between
’generalizations of fac t’ and ’generalizations of l a w ’
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The extent to which a classification scheme can be
’logically arbitrary’ is well illustrated in the following
taxonomy, reputed to be of ancient Chinese origin:
... animals are divided into: a)
belonging to the Emperior, b) em
balmed, c) tame, d)suckling pigs,
e) mermaids, f) fabulous, g)dogs
running free, h) included in the
present classification, i) which
behave like madmen, j) innumer
able, k) drawn on camel-skin
with a very fine brush, l) et
cetera, m) which have just broken
their leg, n) which from a dis
tance look like flies. (24N)
Watanabe’s Theorem, of course, corroborates in
directly Blumer’s assertion that there may be different
’objects’ for different people; different ’wor l ds ’ for
different groups

(25),

Peter Winch, in his book The Idea of a Social Science
(26), also stressed the rule-following characteristics of
social behavior.

Winch presents a number of arguments, of

which the following three will be discussed: 1) a nomothetic
science of human behavior is impossible

(27), 2) it is ne

cessary to understand the ’mode of discourse’ (the language)
of the group being studied

(28), 3) the method of philo

sophical analysis (conceptual analysis) is necessary in
order to understand a mode of social life

(29N).

There have been many criticisms of W i n c h ’s arguments,
but one in particular seems to be more important than the
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Others: the criticism that Richard S. Rudner presents in
his "Philosophy of Social Sciences"

(SON).

Rudner focuses

upon the second and third arguments listed above.

However,

his criticism occurs within a chapter concerning the ob
jectivity of social science, in which he also discusses
Emergentism and delineates two uses of the term ’meaning
f u l ’.

He earlier presented,

law model of explanation.

and affirmed, Hempel's covering-

Rudner claims to refute W i n c h ’s

second argument by showing that it is a subtle form of the
’reproductive fallacy’ (31) and he assumes that the third
argument also falls because it is dependent on the validity
of the second.

Rudner does not explicitly discuss W i n c h ’s

first argument (above), but he does claim to refute the
argument for emergence: which is, of course. W i n c h ’s first
argument.

Rudner’s discussion is complex and it will be

easier, and perhaps clearer, if W i n c h ’s argument against
the possibility of a nomothetic social science is presented
first, and then compared with Rudner's refutation of Emer
gentism.
Winch asserts that science studies uniformities and
that "... statements of uniformities' presuppose judgments
of identity"

(32).

He observes that the criteria of uni

formity (sameness) that the sociologist must use are those
that are specified by the group that he is studying,(i.e.
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Ernie criteria)

(33).

In other words, whereas the natural

scientist studies 'reality’, the sociologist can only
study those aspects of ’reality’ - that ’meaningless in
finity of the world process’ - that are selected by the
group he is studying.

Winch continues by observing that

these rules (criteria) are based on a social context of
common activity

(34), and asserts that voluntary behavior

i.e. social behavior, is "behavior to which there is an
alternative"

(35N),

He concludes that behavior has a

characteristic different from that of the movements of
matter:
... the central concepts which
belong to our understanding of
social life are incompatible
with concepts central to the
activity of scientific pre
diction. (36)
W i n c h ’s conclusion is also corroborated by Wata
nab e’s Ugly Duckling Theorem:

if there is no logical basis

in ’similarity’ there can be no ’generalization of l a w ’
concerning what is to count as similar from one group to
the next, from one individual to another,

or indeed, from

one point in time to the next.
Rudner first presents the ’hypothesis’ of absolute
Emergentism

(37N), and then claims to refute it by merely

asserting that no one has ever

come close to proving it

(38N).. Absolute Emergentism is, he states, the belief that:
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... some events are, in prin
ciple, unpredictable (i.e.,
there are events the predic
tion of which is logically
impossible), since they are
not connected with other
events in any lawlike fashion.

(39)
If we acknowledge that events are not ’events' i.e.
that we must select in our descriptions

(Morgenbesser),

then Watanabe’s proof appears to be a proof of absolute
emergence in ’similarity’

(40N).

The central concept of Blumer, the ’process of
self-indication’ is also, for the same reasons, an emer
gent process; that is, the ’distinctions’ that have been
encoded in a language are emergent because there is no
logical basis for the way in which ’similarities’ have
been clustered and the distinctions (redefinitions) that
the actor makes are emergent for the same reasons (i.e.
’distinction A ’ and ’distinction B ’ of Chapter II).
The two other arguments of Winch (#2 and #3) can be
inferred from the conjunction of Quin e ’s analysis of
language and Winch's earlier statement that "the con
cepts we have settle for us the form of the experience
we have of the world " (41).

Briefly, if the majority of

the ’w o r d s ’ of a language are not conditioned to stimuli,
and if the ’wo r d s ’ (concepts of a language determine the
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way in which the 'natives' see the world, then it is essen
tial to learn that language in order to attempt to describe
their world view.
Quine stresses).

(There are limitations and problems as
Winch's third argument follows because some

form of 'conceptual analysis', i.e. knowledge of synonyms, is
involved in learning any language.

Winch did not assert, in

argument 3, that philosophical analysis was sufficient as well
necessary (42).
Rudner, however, did not interpret Winch's arguments (#2
and #3 above) in the same way that I have.

He has some justi

fication because Winch goes into a discussion of Weber's
'Verstehen' concept (43N), in which Winch asserts that statis
tical data alone are not sufficient to validate an 'interpre
tation' of a rule (44N).

Winch argues that 'understanding'

in

volves "grasping the point or meaning of what is being said or
done" (45 ).

Winch's argument is not particularly lucid as he

does not indicate that there are two ways, at least, of looking
at rule-following behavior:

from the point of view of a logi

cian or from the viewpoint of an ethnographer (or linguist).
Winch uses the logician's approach, i.e. Wittgenstein’s.

The

logician emphasizes that the use of a rule is an all or nothing
affair; one either 'gets the poi nt ’ or one d oe s n ’t, e.g. "Either
I 'see'

(or 'it strikes me') that the consequence follows or I

fail to see it".

(Mitchell, 1970:63), see also Foucault's re

mark concerning the Chinese taxonomy: footnote 24).

This is

the aspect of rule learning that Winch is stressing in his
argument and for this aspect statistics are irrelevant.
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ever, from the linguist's viewpoint, in order for him to know
that he has described a rule that the majority of the 'natives'
use, he must, of course,

'count heads'.

That is, in general,

and in particular, from Quine's discussion and from Blumer's
'redefinition of the situation* concept, any single actor may em
ploy a rule that is not common to many, or any of the other 'na
tives': this does not reduce the rule's

'validity' for the actor,

but does reduce its 'significance' for the linguist.
Rudner, not seeing that Winch is using the logician's ap
proach, claims that Winch argues for the necessity of a 'direct
experience'

of the subject matter, and he therefore asserts that

Winch is committing the "reproductive fallacy"

(46N).

(Winch

does, of course, argue for a 'direct experience', but only in
the sense of learning a language: a 'game').
Rudner's discussion of 'objectivity*

is also obscure because

he shifts from considering the possibility of scientific ex
planations

(Hempel's covering-law explanations) to considering

the possibility of validating observation-statements; that is,
to answering the question:
(is) "X is valued or judged to be
important by Y)... logically imper
vious to validation through the
scientific method? (47)
The obscurity occurs in his usage of 'the scientific method'.
Whatever this may mean, it does not refer to Hempel's coveringlaw model because Hempel's theory does not discuss the validation
of observation-statements.

Neither does Rudner explain what this

'method' involves, except by indirect references to the principle
of inter-subjectivity (48N).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

Furthermore, Rudner fails to differentiate between
’u s e ’ and ’mention’ in his discussion of the term ’meaning
ful'.

He delineates two usages of this term: a semantical

(nonevaluational) use or sense, and an 'evaluational' usage.
The latter usage occurs when the speaker is referring to the
"importance or value" that things have.

Rudner then assumes

that since we can differentiate two 'types' of 'meaningful'
when we talk about the term (which of course is possible),
we can therefore argue that an actor can use either 'sense'
independently of the other.
shown in chapter II.

This is not the case, as was

In Blumer's terms, the actor must

choose each time he acts (which includes speaking) and this
means that when the actor 'reaffirms' an existing distinction
(definition) he is attaching

'importance' to the distinction.

He could have rejected it, and it is likely that he had a
number of possible 'definitions' to choose from.
Rudner acknowledges that the 'evaluational' usage is
important in the argument that asserts that the "... valuational predicates that occur in social science theories or
hypotheses are not definable by any set of observation pre
dicates"

(49 ). The reverse of this: that no valuational

predicates can be derived from observation predicates,

is

the argument against naturalistic ethics: which is Blumer's
"moral principles are human constructs" argument

(50N).
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The focus of this chapter has been the question
"Why this rule?"

(51N). It has been claimed here that there

can be no theoretical covering-law explanations of rulefollowing behavior.

It may be helpful at this point to

examine the game of chess, as an example of rule-following
behavior

(52N), and delineate what a covering-law explanation

of chess would require.

There are, in our culture,

"chess

masters", but no "chess scientists!"
Perhaps the first thing to note about chess is that
it is not legitimate to assume that the rules continue un
changed from game to game

(53N), A survey of this campus

would show that the rules often change, even within 'one
game'.

Michael Scriven attempted to delineate an example

of essential unpredictability by constructing a 'guessing'
game.

His example was analyzed by Patrick Suppes, who

showed that as long as the game is known probabilistic pre
dictions can be made.

However, Suppes asserts that the game

must not be changed:
... it is important to emphasize
that prior to the analysis of the
predictability of C's moves, we
must fix upon the game that C is
playing...
If, in fact, they
are not playing this game but
some other game, then what is to
be said about predictability must
be changes. (54)
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The rules of chess are such that it is logically
impossible to learn them all from the observation of one
game

(55N). A covering-law explanation would require that

the rules of chess, since they 'cannot explain themselves'
(Goldstein), be determined by some 'law', and such a 'law'
would have to explain the variations that occur between
Persian chess, Chinese chess, American chess; and of course,
all the variations that can be observed on this campus, and
elsewhere.
Chess, or at least the chess game approved by the
International Chess authorities, has been extensively ana
lyzed.

There are reams of books.

However, a change of

even one rule relegates all previous analyses to the his
torians; they are no longer valid analyses.

For example,

there is a rumor among chess players that the 'pawn' may be
allowed to move one square backwards,

as well as forwards.

The pawn is the lowest valued unit on the board, yet this
modification would completely change the tactics and stra
tegies of the chess game.

All previous discussions of the

value or importance of certain moves or positions would be
invalid.

New analyses might of course confirm sone of the

previous analyses, but until that time it would not be
possible to answer the question "Is X a good position
(move)?"
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The game of chess would appear to be much less complex
than the

’g a m e ’ of life, or the 'game* of language, yet the

number of possible moves in chess is so great that it is
not feasible to programme a computer to evaluate all the
possible moves in any one game.

This being the case, Winch's

statement that "the concepts we have settle for us the ex
perience we have of the world" must be interpreted figura
tively.

Polanyi has drawn attention to the very large number

of permutations that can be developed from the twenty-six
letters of the alphabet

(56). A similar operation is pos

sible, to some degree, with concepts.

For example, the

'wings' of a bird may be, in the imagination, attached to
a horse, thereby creating a Pegasus figure.

Similarly

'hard' and 'radiation' can be combined in 'hard radiation':
a combination that the usual usage of the term 'hard' does
not imply.
element,

There is, of course, an additional "creative"

over and above permutation, which enables the

actor to attach 'significance' to aspects of the 'world'
which had not previously been significant.
There remains the problem of validating observation
statements.

Rudner asks whether the statement "X is valued

or judged important by Y" can be validated by the scientific
method.

The term "validate" can, as has been discussed, re

fer to two different processes: the validation of a statement
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that an individual Y values X, or the validation of the
statement that a group Y values X.

In the first case,’

the veracity of the statement ultimately requires Y to
answer in the affirmative.

That this is the case follows

from the ’f a c t ’ that X is a description of a 'state of af
fairs, and as such the description has neither intrinsic
significance nor a one-to-one correspondence to any 'thing'.
The same description can 'refer' to more than one 'state of
affairs',

and different descriptions can 'refer' to the same

'state of affairs'

(57N).

There may be times when observa

tion of behavior alone will indicate whether Y values X, but
only if X is a common Ernie description of a 'state of af
fairs'.

For example, if I make a silent resolution to stop

smoking cigarettes, the modification of my behavior will be
noticed by my friends and probably by an observer; but only
because the smoking/non-smoking distinction is significant
within this society.

However,

suppose that I make a silent

resolution always to hold a cup with my little finger held
straight.

There may be societies where the position of

one's little finger when drinking from a cup

is significant,

but the campus culture here is not one of them.

In this

case, neither my friends nor the observer w o u l d detect
this behavior modification, because the 'state of affairs'
to which I attach significance is not significant to others.
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Even when X appears to be a common ’state of affairs’,
observation alone, i.e. no communication, will probably
attach significance to the wrong elements (see Sapir, foot
note 35, chapter II).

Even when the language is known,

Q u i n e ’s analysis indicates that there will remain some
’systematic indeterminacy’: but the language of the ’natives’
must be known in order to describe those aspects of a situa
tion that they consider significant.
The validation of the statement concerning a group
involves all the previous problems plus the problem of
’counting h e ad s’.

Should the population be large, sampling

methods may have to be used.
There are two further aspects of the process of vali
dation that warrant some discussbn.

The first concerns the

validation of our evaluations (i.e. Etic evaluations) of
the similarities,
other groups.

or differences, between the ’ru l e s ’ of

At least two anthropologists have written

articles on this subject: Macbeath sees many differences
between cultures, while Mead sees many similarities

(58).

The Ugly Duckling Theorem implies that there can be no
’validation’: there is no logical basis in 'similarities’.
The only criterion is the criterion of consensus.
can be no other

There

(59N).
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The second point about validation concerns the problem
of 'exceptions’.

These may be of various types: a) there is

an individual member of a tribe who makes a new distinction,
e.g. "Two Crows" interchanges the Z and A of the alphabet
(60N); b) all cultures except one or two have both a high
degree of stratification and slavery (61N); c ) the 'ideal'
culture prescribes polygamy but the 'actual' culture is
predominantly monogamous

(62N).

T o the extent that these

'exceptions' concern rule-governed behavior, they cannot
be theoretical problems: rule-governed behavior not being
subsumable under covering-laws.

Obviously there can be

exceptions, i.e. deviancy from prescribed laws, but this
is not the point.

There may be problems in ascertaining

the extent of the 'exceptions', i.e.

'counting heads', but

this is a statistical problem, not a theoretical one

(63N).

The preceding discussion has concerned only those
parts of social behavior that are rule-governed.
anthropologists have delinated behavioral

Although

'traits' which

they say are cultural universals, there is some disagree
ment as to the validity and explanatory power of this
dichotomy between cultural universals and cultural par
ticulars'

(64N).

M e l v i n M, T u m i n r e c e n t l y observed that

patterns of behavior cannot be explained by biological
instincts or psychological drives.

The factors he
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delineates all refer to values, or to synonyms of values;
The patternings of motives,
forms, and consequences - are
the products of ideologies,
values, interests, resources,
world views, and philosophies,
and they change continuously...
(65N ).
While the Ugly Duckling Theorem has been the main
analytical tool of this chapter, the analysis could just
as easily have been drawn from a study of Polanyi, Quine,
Waisman, and Ayer, etc.

The following quotation expresses,

in different words, the central place that 'value* has in
the study of human behavior:
An order is an arrangement with
respect to which it would matter
If it were otherwise. And this
holds for order in science, in
art, in civil life, whereever in
fact the concept applies... The
question about order, then, is
not why things should be dis
posed in a certain way, but why
it should matter that they are
disposed in this way.
And that
transforms the question into a
question about value.
(66N)
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C h a p te r I I I

1.

This is not to deny that there are areas ofsocial
behavior which may not be rule-governed.
See sub
sequent discussion.

2.

Scriven, 1968:84.

3.

Geertz, 1968,:404-405.

4.

Purtill, 1970:306.
Purtill claims that it is now
generally agreed that the aim of science is to ex
plain, but he wonders if this is a description of
what scientists do, or advice as to what they should
do.

5.

Kuhn, 1970:160-161.

6.

Kuhn, 1970:171-172.

7.

Kuhn, 1970:146,170 ff. He also notes: "Philosophers
of science have repeatedly demonstrated that more
than one theoretical construction can always be
placed upon a given collection of data... it is not
even very difficult to invent such alternatives (in
early stages of a new science) p. 76.
(See also
note 54, chapter II)

8.

Carl G . Hempel and Paul Oppenheim.
"Studies in the
Logic of Explanations", in Philosophy of Science,
Vol.15, No.2, April, 1948.
Reprinted in The Bobbs
Merrill Reprint Series in Philosophy, Phil - 100.
Hempel*s most recent exposition in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philo
sophy of 'Science. New York: The Free Press, 1965.

9.

Hempel speaks of two models in some essays.
These
are the 'deductive-nomological* and the ’inductive
probabilistic’. (See Krimmerman, 1969:137).
Hempel considers the ’inductive probabilistic’ model to be of less significance.
This is, however,
a controversial position and Hans Reichenbach has
argued extensively that all knowledge is based on
probability.
(See Reichenback, 1961)
The analysis
in this thesis is based on Hem pe l’s ’deductivenomological’ model, but it is acknowledged that a
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9.

complete analysis would include the probabilistic
model.
This has not been attempted here because
the probabilistic model is itself subject to
controversy.

10.

Krimmerman, 1969:43-45.

11.

Hempel, 1965:425.

12.

Hempel, in Krimmerman, 1969:135.

13.

Krimmerman’s volume, 750 pages, is only a small part
of the writings concerning scientific explanations.
A.J. Ayer distinguishes ’generalizations of f a c t ’
and 'generalizations of l a w ’, and discusses the
criteria that might be used to distinguish them.
He
asserts that we
in fact, distinguish them, but
our criteria are unclear.
Karl R. Popper differentiates 'laws’ from
'trends'.
Universal laws do not assert existence
whereas trends do assert existence (115).
"Explained
trends do exist, but their persistence depends upon
the persistence of certain specific initial condi
tions." (p 128) A trend may change overnight.
He
claims that historicists assume that trends are un
conditional and states that the poverty of the
historicists is a poverty of the imagination; they
are unable to "imagine a change in the conditions
of change".
(Popper, 1957:130)

14.

Hempel, in Krimmerman, 1969:136.

15.

Stephens M. Dietz, in a recent article, discusses
some of the pragmatic aspects of H em p e l ’s model.
He shows that D r a y ’s notion of ’explaining how-possibly' is a special sort of ’explanation-sketch’ and
confirms Hempel’s thesis.
Dietz erroneously assumes
that Hempel claims to be descriding what scientists
actually do "... for he (Hempel) would not have given
us any realistic account of what scientists usually
do." (p 616)
Compare this with Hemp el ’s statement:
"... we can also dismiss the complaint that the
covering-law models do not, in general, accord with
the manner in which working scientists actually
formulate their explanations," (because the scientists
direct their explanations to a particular audience)
(Hempel in Krimmerman: 136)
(Dietz, 1970:614-617)
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16.

Polanyi*s concept of ’tacit* knowledge also relates
scientific explanations to ’individuals’. (Polanyi,
1967)

17.

Morgenbesser, 1968:121.

18.

Hospers discusses the need for general words and
notes that the ’act of classifying is the work of
human beings.
(Hospers, 1967:45.47)
Copi states
that classification schemes are hypotheses which
group ’important’ characteristics.
His criteria
of ’important’ characteristics is: "involved in a
greater number of causal laws..."
(Copi, 1963:
409-410)
Neither gives a proof that classifica
tion is nonlogical.

19.

Watanabe, 1969:526.

20.

Watanabe, 1969:526.
He outlines his procedure in
this essay but refers to his other essays forlhe
proof.

21.

Watanabe, 1969:526.

22.

A scientific explanation must be about ’events’
(i.e. descriptions of events) and must therefore
be expressed in an interpreted calculus, and inter
pretation will be logically arbitrary according to
Watanabe.
See footnote 40.

23.

See note 13, chapter III.
Ayer gives the following
as an example of a ’generalization of fac t’: "...
All the Presidents of the Third French Republic are
male".
For ’generalization of law" he states:"the
planets of our solar system move in elliptical
orbits".
(Ayer, 1970:39,48)

24.

Caws, 1970:208.
Caws excerpted this quotation from
Michael Foucault’s "Les Mots et les Choses".
The
quotation from Foucault continues:
"In our astonish
ment at this taxonomy what strikes us... is... the
stark impossibility of thinking that" . Foucault ap
parently believes this taxonomy to be a figment of
B org e’s imagination.

25.

Blumer, 1969b:ll.

26.

Published in 1958.
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27.

Winch, 1967:94.

28.

Winch, 1967:110,15.

29.

Winch, 1967:113.
The analysis involves "the as
sertion of equivalence between two expressions".
(Urmson, 1956:116)
Urmson states that conceptual
analysis involves the problems of synonomy, vague
ness, ambiguity, etc.

30.

Rud n er ’s book is
inexpensive and is also one of a
paperback series on philosophy: "Foundations of
Philosophy Series".

31.

Rudner, 1966:83.

32.

Winch, 1967:83.

33.

Winch, 1967:86-87.

34.

Winch, 1967:84.

35.

Winch, 1967:91.
Compare with Toynbeejs statements;
I therefore think that a formula
such as "challenge and response"
is a more realistic approach to
the study of human affairs, p 56.
A single cause must have a single
uniform effect every time that this
cause comes into operation.
But a
challenge may have at least two
responses, I will or I won't, and
it may have quite a number of
variations.
(Toynbee, 1968:57)

36. Winch, 1967:94.
37.

Rudner, 1966:71.
He dismisses Relative Emergence
(the belief that it is not technically possible to
predict at this time) by noting that although it
"is doubtless true, it does not imply that any
social p he nom en a are closed to i n v e s t i g a t i o n by
means of the scientific method." (p 71}
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38.

Michael Polanyi has always argued for the necessity
of 'emergent theories’ in the study of human affairs
(and in biology).
Although I have few references to
his works, my interest in Emergence has been greatly
stimulated by his writings.
In particular by Personal
Knowledge : Towards a_ Post-Critical Philosophv.

39.

Rudner, 1966:71.

40.

This is not a restriction to the natural scientist.
They agree to 'select' only certain aspects of
’t hi n g s ’ to study.
(See Polanyi, 1964:13-17,163 ff,

292-294)
41.

Winch,1967:15.

42.

Winch, 1967:118.
Statistics "might form part of the
argument" (re validity).

43.

There have been many ’interpretations' of "Verstehen".
A recent article by Warringer, while initially murky,
does approach the delineation that I present here.
(Warringer, 1969)

44.

Winch, 1967:113.
Inasmuch as Winch, in this para
graph, suggests that statistics are somewhat rele
vant, he clouds the issue.
Rudner takes Winch to
be saying that they (statistics) are 'wholly ir
relevant", and for learning a rule, they are ir
relevant, as is explained.

45.

Winch, 1967:115.

46.

Rudner, 1966,:82-83.
The ’reproductive fallacy’ in
volves the belief (fallacious) that science is sup
posed to 'reproduce' 'reality'.
Rudner quotes
Einstein: "... it is not the function of science
’to give the taste of the soup"', p 69.
It should
be noted that Winch explicitly rejects any ’innersense’ type of Verstehen.
(See p 119)

47.

Rudner, 1966:79.

48.

For example: "... to provide the empathizer with a
reliable basis for accepting or rejecting his hypo
thesis about the phenomenon he is investigating.
We
must have established independently that the empathy
is . .7" ("Rudner, 1966:73, my emphasis)

Italics in original.
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49.

Rudner, 1966:80.

50.

A sociologist, Christopher G.A. Bryant, has re
cently responded to some of Winch's arguments
(and, he claims, to some of the arguments of
MacIntyre and Louch). His discussion is somewhat
confused as he does not clearly distinguish be
tween the criteria needed for scientific explana
tions and those needed for validation of observation-statements. He attempts, among other
things, to classify social phenomena into cate
gories, ordered as to their susceptibility to
causal analysis (p 101).
Of the three cate
gories, the first category, the one most amen
able to causal analysis, includes ’age-structure'
as an example.
He subsequently asserts: "Socio
logists can identify these phenomena according
to the characteristics they themselves attribute
to them because they exist independently of any
human conception of them", (p 103)
I do not understand what Bryant means.
It
seems as if he is saying that there are babies,
older babie , young children, older children, etc.,
in all societies; but this is not to state that all
societies change their classification categories at
the same chronological age, nor to state that the
'appropriate' behavior for any 'age-grade' is the
same in all societies.
(All babies, I admit, do
apparently make sucking motions when very young!)
Category 2 uses "class" and :language" as examples.
Category 3 is for rule-following actions.
He does
not show clearly how the 'behavior' of categories
1 and 2 is not rule-following.
He does assert:
"Laws in natural science are supposed to be time
less and unchanging.
Many 'laws' in social science
are principles which explain what occurs, and they
continue to work until they are reflected upon and
if need be challenged...
The principles are not
challenged that often", (p 102;
(Compare this to
The Povertv of Historicism, footnote 13, this
chapter). (Bryant, 1970:95-107)

51.

R. Brown observes that it is obvious that social
behavior is rule-conforming and asserts that the
social scientist "... is impelled to ask 'Why
this intention...? or 'Why this rule...?' and
the chain of answers will soon enough depend on

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89

51.

referring to neither goals nor rules for its ex
planatory power".
(Brown, 1963:98)
A similar observation was made by Goldstein
in his review of W i n c h ’s book. Goldstein states:
"... if I want to account for the existence of an
institution, or if I want to explain the existence
in this society of some particular rule, I cannot
appeal to the rule to explain itself ... To explain
the presence of institutions, I m u st be able to
specify the conditions which give them rise ... it
is clear.that if he (the sociologist) is not per
mitted to go beyond the given rules he cannot ex
plain them, (p 333) (Winch, of course, is arguing
that the sociologist is not able to go beyond the
rules).
(Goldstein, 1960:332-333)

52.

There can be more than one type of ’r u l e ’; Von
Wright delineates three types.
It may well be that
each type of rule requires, or is associated with, a
different type of rule-following behavior.
(Von
Wright, 1963: ch.l)

53.

A mistake that Ryle makes.
He assumes constancy:
"After much research tils spectator will have worked
out all the rules of chess ...
(Ryle, 1968:75, my
emphasis)

54.
55.

56.

Suppes, 1969:286-287.
The game can end either in ’check-mate' or ’stale
m a t e ’, but not both (ignoring the act of conceding).
Polanyi, 1964:78.

57.

’Morning Star', 'Evening Star' and 'Venus’ are ex
amples often used in philosophical literature.

58.

Alexander Macbeath.
The Relationship of Primitive
Morality and Religion.
London: Macmillan, 1949.
Margaret Mead. "Some Anthropological Considerations
Concerning Natural Law", in Natural Law Forum, vi,
1961, pp 51-64.
These works are referred to by
Vernon J. Bourke.
H i s t o r y of E t h i c s , Vol.2, Image
Books, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968,
1970, p 155.
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59. In Stevenson's terms, a "disagreement in belief" can
not be resolved by reference t o ’facts’.
60. Edward Sapir notes that any deviation from the norm can
become the norm, and suggests that the ultimate criterion
of "value interpretation" is "... nothing more than con
sensus of opinion" (p 572).
He also discusses the prob
lem of one informer denying what another has affirmed,
and Sapir appears to opt for a statistical resolution:
the majority rule.
(Sapir, 1963:569-577)
61. A.J.F. Kobben discusses some of the problems of crosscultural research.
He does not present any theoretical
solutions but notes that many anthropological terms are
too monolithic: they cover a multitude of sins.
(Kobben,
1967:3-34)
62. Hugo G. Nutini discusses this problem in an article
concerning Lévi-Strauss.
He claims that descriptions
of both the ’ideal’ (Mechanical in Lévi-Strauss’ termi
nology) and the actual (statistical) should be con
structed, but asserts that the statistical ’m o d e l ’ should
be subordinated to the mechanical (p 95): "... mechanical
models are always heuristically superior to statistical
models..." (p 95). He, however, does not offer any
explanation of why the mechanical model is superior, or
in what way it expiai s ’m o r e ’ than the statistical
model.
(Nutini, 1970:70-107)
63. Herbert Dingle discusses the relationship between
statistical knowledge and causal knowledge.
His
example concerns the number of unaddressed envelopes
that are mailed each year in England: the proportion
remains constant from year to year.
He states:
[the statistical information] is some
thing superposed on the causal and, so
far as we can see, not dependent on it
at all... we cannot even begin to ex
press one in terms of the other with
out destroying them... we have here
two essentially different kinds of
regularity, one applicable to single
events and the other to collections
of similar events... (and it is de
lusion to attempt to explain either
in terms of the other).
(Dingle,
1970:235-236)
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64.

Murdock finds cultural universals valuable, while
Geertz argues that they are of no value.
(G.P.
Murdock, 1947: "The Common Denominator of Culture".
(Clifford Geertz, 1965: "The Impact of the Concept
of Culture on the Concept of Man".

65.

Melvin M. Tumin, 1970:21.
Tumin also asserts that
power determines the tenacity and initiation of
patterns of behavior.

66.

Caws, 1968:106.
Carl J. Friedrich, in the same
volume asserts:
Conflicts of principle are at the
very essence of political order...
There never has been any resolution
of their contradictions, and there
never will be any resolution in
terms of any order of priority.
(Friedrich, 1968:343).
Kuntz, in the Introduction,
states: "There emerges a concensus among authorities.
No one of them considers the moral order derivative
from the natural order...
In a word, they all defend
the autonomy and irreducibility of the moral order",
(p.XXVIII).
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CHAPTER IV
SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

The analyses presented in the previous chapters have
shown that there can be no covering-law theories concerning
rule-governed behavior (1).

This does not mean that socio

logy requires only conceptual analysis, which was one of
Win ch ’s conclusions.

Winch failed, as was shown, to dis

tinguish between the logician’s approach and the ethno
grapher’s approach: the ethnographer must discover the ex
tent of any rule.

(Winch may, of course, have considered

this to be other than ’analysis’).

This is not to deny

that conceptual analysis may be very useful, although Winch
did fail to mention that the ’ordinary language’ philosophers,
e.g. the Oxford School, rarely agree upon the ’usa g e’ of any
term

(2). Conceptual analysis can be very illuminating,

Joseph Bea tt y’s analysis of the concept ’’Forgiveness’’

e.g.

(s)<

However, the validity of conceptual analyses cannot be veri
fied by any experimental method: one ’sees' or one doe sn ’t (4).
Rule-governed behavior,

although not subsumable under

covering-laws, may manifest the characteristics of 'trends’.
And, as Karl Popper has emphasized, trends may change over
night

(5 ), The most that we can do, it would seem, is to
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trace the forms that these various rules have taken through
time: a methodology adopted by Eliade in his studies of
religious phenomena

(6).

Blumer, and others

(7), have

stressed that social behavior is characterized by "continual
flux": this "flux" brings into question the utility of re
plication studies and also those studies in which, for the
purpose of ’completeness’, a long time is spent in observa
tion.

For example, Becker states that he and his colleagues

spent more than three man-years studying an undergraduate
college:

"All these numbers serve simply to indicate that

there is a sufficiency of date gathered over a substantial
period of time"

(8). Assuming

’trends’ rather than ’law s’,

what amount is a ’sufficient’ amount of data and what amount
is a ’substantial’ amount of time?

Becker discusses this in

relation to a number of studies including those of Tepoztlan
by Redfield and Lewis.

He implies that we can never expect

two researchers to agree because either their subject will
have changed in the course of time, or the researchers will
approach their subject-matter with different points of view
(9 ). The researcher, like the historian (Cf. Walsh),

appears

to be the final authority concerning the validity of his
studies

(excluding statistical problems).

It was noted in Chapter I that Blumer does not provide
criteria for differentiating between ’an a c t ’, ’the a c t ’ and
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•acts’.

The difficulty of specifying the descriptive ele/
ments of an action has been seen as a serious problem by a
number of philosophers.

Austin suggested that we have to:

... decide what is the correct
name for "the" action that some
body did - and what, indeed, are
the rules for the use of "the"
action, "an" action... (10, my
emphasis)
Austin observes that it is possible to describe what a
person did in many different ways, and that an action is
composed of more than just physical movements

(ll).

Philosophers interested in deontic logic have also
discussed the problem of describing actions and ’states of
affairs’.
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

Rescher has delineated five aspects of action:

Agent (Who did it?)
Act-type (What did he do?)
Modality of Action (How did he do it?)
a. Modality of manner (In what manner
did he do it?)
b. Modality of means ( ^ what means
did he do it?)
Setting of Action ( ^ what context
did he do it?)
a. Temporal aspect (when did he do it?)
b. Spatial aspect (Where did he do it?)
c. Circumstantial aspect (Under what
circumstances did he do it?)
Rationale of Action (Why did he do it?)
a. Causality (What caused him to do it?)
b. Finality (With what aim did he do it?)
c. Intentionality (in what state of mind
did he do it?) (12)

Rescher states in a footnote that the second "... is
the fundamental item in the specification of an action."
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and subsequently asserts that it may vary in degree of
concreteness: "It can be a fully generic act-type, e.g.
'the opening of a window'...

(or) a specific act-type

('the opening of this window')"

(14).

Other philosophers, however, have delineated some
problems concerning the specification of 'generic'
of affairs

states

(15), While the study of the logic of actions

is obviously very relevant for all research concerning
rule-governed behavior, there exists the possibility that
people are not entirely logical.

Both Ackerman and Chisolm

raise questions concerning the empirical utility of deontic
logic and the logic of preference

(16).

This thesis has acknowledged that there may be areas
of social behavior which are not characterized by rulefollowing actions, and it is suggested that the delineation
of these areas should be one of the primary tasks of socio
logists: a task that Bryant has initiated (Cf. footnote 50,
Chapter II).
There is, additionally, the need to delineate clearly
the methods to which we relate our conceptual models to the
observed behavior.

For example,

'primary groups'

occur, it

would appear, in all cultures: but the behavior that is in
dicative of a primary group may vary from group to group.
The concept 'primary group' therefore appears to function
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as an Ideal Type, for which there is no exact observable
instance.

If this is the case, it is essential to delineate

the methods and criteria that enable us to relate the ob
served structure to the Ideal pattern.
discussion of pattern recognition,
that an analysis should meet.

Grenander,

in his

lists seven requirements

He states:

... if we do not specify how the
observables are related to the pure
patterns we have left out one of
the most crucial steps in the whole
approach. (17)
Although Grenander’s statement refers to pattern re
cognition by a computer, he asserts that his analysis is
applicable to other areas, such as biology.
relevant to sociology.

It is also

Our example, the concept ’primary

group’ has some specified characteristic behavior patterns
as its empirical indicators.

We, however, have to evaluate

those patterns that are observed to determine their ’simi
larity’ to our Ideal patterns.

And this evaluation of

’similarity’ has no logical basis.

We can, of course,

specify

a different set of criteria, and there is no way of objectively
deciding between the two sets of criteria.
The position of the natural sciences is no different,
although it does appear that they are more ’objective’
The natural sciences do, of course, have

(18),

’law s ’ but there is

Still an inherent uncertainty because more than one theory
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can be fitted to any collection of data (19) and, since
’evidence’ within one theoretical approach is often con
sidered ’epiphenomena’ by an alternative approach, the
evaluation of rival theories is much more difficult that
it might appear

(20). Kuhn asserts that natural science

may appear stable because most scientists spend most of
their life working within one ’paradigm’, solving puzzles
set by that ’paradigm’

(21).

Blumer’s symbolic interactionism is indeed more of an
orientation than a theory; it cannot be subsumed under any
covering-laws.

Rule following behavior, while not amenable

to covering-law explanations,can still be studied and des
cribed, and these descriptions will be valid as long as
there are no changes in the rules.

As Peters has suggested:

Man in society is like a chess
player write large. (22)
However, Peters, in the same paragraph, also asserts
that prediction is possible: an observation that does not
appear congruent with a chess model of society.
Although there have been many comments made about
Winch’s argument that a nomothetic science of social be
havior is impossible, a similar assertion had been previously
made by Karl Popper.

He stated that positive predictions in

sociology were not possible:

(23)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98

We cannot exclude the logical pos
sibility, say, of a bacterium or
virus that spreads a wish for Ni r 
vana (p 157 ).......... .............
... the human factor is the ultimate
and wayward element in social life
and social institutions... for every
attempt at controlling it completely
must lead to tyranny; which means,
to the omnipotence of the human
factor - the whims of a few men, or
even of one. (24;
Popper suggests that social theory, while it cannot
predict,

can analyze and explicate the logical consequences

of adopting any principle or embarking on any course of
action.

He gives, as an example, the possible consequences

of a large number of people manifesting the desire for
mountains and solitude:
... if many people like the mountains,
they cannot enjoy solitude... this kind
of problem is at the very root of social
theory. (25)
Edward A. Tiryakian has suggested that because socio
logy lacks a philosophical background, "... research pro
jects accumulate, but are not cumulative"

(26)» The

analyses presented in this thesis suggest that sociology,
on the contrary, has a philosophical background, and that
’research projects

may accumulate, but cannot be cumula

tive ’.
However, there are also structural aspects of social
behavior which may well be amenable to covering-law
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explanations, although it must be borne in mind that,
Blumer explicitly denies the utility of structural ex
planations (see footnotes 45 and 46 in Chapter l).
In addition, some patterns of behavior are common
to all societies.
riage and religion

For example, the institutions of mar
(27), These

'cultural universals' may

also be amenable to covering-law explanations.

Blumer,

however, is not inclined to accept this (see footnote 73,
Chapter I ) .
In conclusion, therefore, we see that, in its analytic
aspects, Blumer's position is largely justified.
minacy is built into any empirical analysis.

Indeter

Here we seem

to be confronted with a fundamental dilemma of methodology:
the indeterminacy of empirical knowledge versus the determinacy of logical thought.

It is this dilemma that gives

initial plausibility to Reichenbach’s argument that know
ledge is built on a probabilistic foundation.
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NOTES:

C h a p te r IV

1.

Watanabe’s theorem would seem relevant for other
theoretical approaches to the study of human be
havior, e.g. structuralism.
While this cannot be
discussed in this paper, it should be observed that
Watanabe’s theorem is relevant to both ’theories’
and descriptions.
Nadel considers structuralism
to be descriptive: "I consider structuralism to be
no more than a descriptive method ... not a piece
of explanation". (Nadel, 1957:151)

2.

Mates, 1964:68.
Mates wonders what the prospects
for agreement would be when the sample size is en
larged.

3.

Beatty, 1970:246-252.
American Philosopical
Quarterly 7, No.3, (July, 1970), pp 246-252.
For an example of conceptual analysis by an
anthropologist see: Hyman, 1966:42-45.

4.

D.B. Fry states that experimental methods can
neither confirm nor contradict knowledge that is
obtained by introspection "... since an experi
mental method and an introspective method col
lect information about different sets of events".
(Fry, 1955:147)

5.

Barrington Moore observes that George Lundberg,
"... confessed that he was at a loss for a good
example of scientific generalization... the only
one he could point to was a rather limited one about
migration... His remark (led) me to doubt that the
"search for scientific laws should constitute the
primary task of sociology".
(Moore, 19 6 3 :93n)

6.

Geertz, 1968:403. Geertz thus assesses Eliade’s
methodology.
Geertz also notes that this is a
kind of "cultural paleontology", and that "it has
placed beyond the range of scientific analysis
everything but the history and morphology of the
... forms...".
Geertz claims that Eliade has uncovered
"some highly suggestive clusterings".
However,
given that rule-governed behavior is not sub
sumable under a ’l a w ’, it is difficult to eva
luate the significance of any "suggestive clusterings"
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7.

Boskoff asserts that Mclver places social change
at the core of his system.
(Boskoff, 1969:125)

8.

Becker, 1970:53.

9.

Becker, 1970:19,40-43.
Kobben also discusses this
problem and gives some examples of ethnographic
reports which have conflicting statements.

10.

Austin, 1965:44.

11.

D.W. Hamlyn discusses the differences between
actions and physical movements.
He traces the
distinction back to Aristotle.
(Hamlyn, 1962:60-73)

12.

Rescher, N.D., 215-216.

13.

Rescher, N.D.: 215n.

14.

Rescher, N . D . : 216.

15.

John Robinson discusses the distinction between
states of affairs "conceived of generically and
individually".
(Robinson, N.D: 140)

16.

Rescher, N . D . : 71,138.

17.

Grenader, 1970:177.

18.
19.
20.

Lawrence LaFave has discussed the way in which
values enier into science.
(LaFave, 1970)
Kuhn, 1970:76.
See Feyerabend' s discussion of the difficulties
involved in comparing theories.
(Feyerabend,
1968:12-39).

21.

Kuhn, 1970:24,36-38.

22.

Peters, 1958:7.

23.

Popper, 1957:158.
Universal laws, for Popper,
asserts the impossibility of something, not the
existence of anything, (p 61)
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24.

Popper, 1957:157-158.

25.

Popper, 1957:158.
His examples of social pre
dictions are, of course, all negative; i.e.
assert the impossibility of something: "You can
not introduce tariffs and at the same time reduce
the cost of living".
"You cannot introduce a
political reform without causing some repercussions
which are undesirable from the point of view of the
ends aimed at".
These examples express logical
impossibilities, and can be rephrased into logical
contradictions.
For instance, the tariff example
can be rephrased: If a country is importing a com
modity which sells for less than a comparable do
mestic commodity, any import restriction or tax
on the imported commodity will remove a 'cheap'
commodity from the market and thereby make pur
chasers pay more.
In other words, if the technical
terms in this social law are replaced by synonyms,
the statement expresses a logical contradiction.
It appears that the method of developing these
'laws' is 'conceptual analysis'.

26.

Tiryakian, 1962:4.

27.

There are problems in defining these terms.
For
example, if religion is defined so as to include
animism, the definition may be unacceptable to
many theists.
For a brief discussion of the
criteria used to define religion, see John Hick
Philosophv of Religion. New Jersey: PrenticeHall Inc.
there are similar problems with the
universal definition of 'marriage'.
See Wm. N.
Stephens, The Familv in Cross-cultural Perspec
t i v e . New York: Holt Rhinehart and Winston
Inc., 1963. pp B f f .
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